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Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation
Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say
Perception: A representative theory
The distinction between mediate and immediate objects of perception three uses of "looks" the existence of mental objects the case for sense-data colour and science the objections to
Reference and Description Revisited
L'A. defend une theorie de la description de la reference dans la langue parlee et dans la langue ecrite en insistant sur le fait que l'on accede aux objets par l'intermediaire de leurs proprietes.
Oughts, options, and actualism
TLDR
The main aim of this paper is to explore and defend Actualism, the view that the values that should figure in determining which option is the best and so ought to be done out of a set of options are the values of what would be the case were the agent to adopt or carry out the option.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis
1. SERIOUS METAPHYSICS AND SUPERVENIENCE 2. THE ROLE OF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 3. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND METAPHYSICAL NECESSITY 4. THE PRIMARY QUALITY VIEW OF COLOUR 5. THE LOCATION PROBLEM FOR ETHICS:
The philosophy of mind and cognition
Preface. Part I: From Dualism to Common-Sense Functionalism: Part II: Rivals and Objections: Part III: About Content: Part IV: Explaining Behaviour: Eliminativism and Realism:
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