In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of preference aggregation.Expand

The widely discussed `discursive dilemma' shows that majority voting in a group of individuals on logically connected propositions may produce irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority… Expand

We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem.Expand

In this paper, I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a specific type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters.Expand

We investigate judgment aggregation by assuming that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premises, and the Independence condition (formula-wise aggregation) holds for them, though perhaps not for others.Expand

This paper introduces a new class of judgment aggregation rules, to be called ‘scoring rules’ after their famous counterparts in preference aggregation theory.Expand

There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with… Expand

This review article introduces and evaluates various ways to aggregate probabilistic opinions of different individuals. For each of these three ways, an axiomatic characterization result is presented… Expand