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Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation
The main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preference aggregation, and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.
STRATEGY-PROOF JUDGMENT AGGREGATION*
All non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules are characterized and an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem is proved, introducing game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.
A generalised model of judgment aggregation
- F. Dietrich
- PhilosophySoc. Choice Welf.
This methodological paper presents a simple unified model of judgment aggregation in general logics, and shows how many realistic decision problems can be represented in it and proves impossibility results that generalise earlier theorems.
Judgment Aggregation By Quota Rules
The widely discussed `discursive dilemma' shows that majority voting in a group of individuals on logically connected propositions may produce irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority…
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
- F. Dietrich
- EconomicsSoc. Choice Welf.
- 1 April 2014
This paper introduces a new class of judgment aggregation rules, to be called ‘scoring rules’ after their famous counterparts in preference aggregation theory, and shows a generalization of the Borda rule to judgment aggregation theory.
The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation
A reason-based theory of rational choice
There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with…
The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory
The ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation are sketched and two new theorems are proved that characterizes some prominent aggregation rules in the cases of probability, judgment and preference aggregation, including linear opinion pooling and Arrovian dictatorships.