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In this paper we present a review of decision methods reported in the literature for supporting the supplier selection process. The review is based on an extensive search in the academic literature. We position the contributions in a framework that takes the diversity of procurement situations in terms of complexity and importance into account and covers(More)
We analyze effects of performance measure properties (controllable and uncontrollable risk, distortion, and manipulation) on incentive plan design, using data from auto dealership manager incentive systems. Dealerships put the most weight on measures that are " better " with respect to these properties. Additional measures are more likely to be used for a(More)
Regulators are charged with closing troubled banks, but can instead practice forbearance by allowing these troubled banks to continue operating. This paper examines whether bank opacity affects regulators’ ability to practice forbearance. Opacity inhibits non-regulator outsiders from accurately assessing bank risk, potentially allowing regulators to forgo(More)
Standard principal-agent theory is generally based on gross performance measures (i.e., before compensation expense), yet boards in practice also determine incentive compensation using net performance measures (i.e., after deducting compensation expense). In a multi-principal, multi-agent model where relative performance evaluation arises endogenously, we(More)
Please do not cite without permission We appreciate the many helpful comments from Design choices regarding the features of a product costing system significantly influence the accuracy of reported costs used in product-and capacity planning decisions. Using simulations, we examine how an amalgam of system design choices influences the error in reported(More)
We explore the theoretical relation between earnings and market returns as well as the properties of accounting earnings frequency distributions under the maintained hypothesis that managers use unbiased accounting information benevolently to prudently manage the firms of which they are appointed stewards. We offer this surprisingly uncommon (in the(More)