• Publications
  • Influence
The Quality of Terror
I present a model of the interaction between a government, a terrorist organization, and potential terrorist volunteers in which, as a result of an endogenous choice, individuals with low ability orExpand
  • 398
  • 30
  • PDF
Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits
We exploit variation in U.S. gubernatorial term limits across states and time to empirically estimate two separate effects of elections on government performance. Holding tenure in office constant,Expand
  • 191
  • 22
  • PDF
Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs
I study how a revolutionary vanguard might use violence to mobilize a mass public. The mechanism is informational—the vanguard uses violence to manipulate population member's beliefs about the levelExpand
  • 202
  • 19
  • PDF
Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence
What causes the increase in terrorism that reportedly often follows government concessions? Given this pattern, why do governments ever conciliate terrorists? I propose a model in which terroristExpand
  • 217
  • 11
  • PDF
The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization
Many terrorist factions care about the level of popular support they enjoy within a population they claim to represent. Empirically, this level of support can either rise or fall in the aftermath ofExpand
  • 303
  • 8
  • PDF
Learning About Voter Rationality
We model the accountability relationship between voters and politicians to clarify what can and can’t be learned about voter rationality from existing evidence from the behavior literature. We makeExpand
  • 58
  • 8
  • PDF
Elections with platform and valence competition
We study a game in which candidates first choose platforms and then invest in costly valences (e.g., engage in campaign spending). Expand
  • 152
  • 6
  • PDF
Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror
I present a model of interactions between voters, a government, and a terrorist organization. The model focuses on a previously unexplored conceptualization of counterterrorism as divided intoExpand
  • 128
  • 5
  • PDF
Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication
We develop an informational model of judicial decision-making in which deference to precedent is useful to policy-oriented appellate judges because it improves the accuracy with which they canExpand
  • 75
  • 3
The Terrorist Endgame
The author models the relationship between a government and former terrorists as a game with both moral hazard and learning. The government is uncertain about both the former terrorists’ abilityExpand
  • 47
  • 3