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Auctions on the Internet provide a new source of data on how bidding is in uenced by the detailed rules of the auction. Here we study the second-price auctions run by eBay and Amazon , in which a bidder submits a reservation price and has this (maximum) price used to bid for him by proxy. That is, a bidder can submit his reservation price (called a proxy(More)
Bidders' asymmetries are widespread in auction markets. Yet, their impact on behavior and, ultimately, revenue and profits is still not well understood. This paper defines a natural benchmark auction environment to which to compare any private values auction with asymmetrically distributed valuations. The main result is that the expected revenue from the(More)
Extended abstract-description of preliminary results At Harvard Business School, like at many other professional schools around the country, stu-dents' learning experience requires limits on the number of students in a class. This creates an interesting allocation problem for school administrations: students need a seat in several classes, and classes have(More)
We propose novel approaches and tests for estimating student preferences with data from school choice mechanisms, e.g., the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance. Without requiring truth-telling to be the unique equilibrium, we show that the matching is (asymptotically) stable, or justified-envy-free, implying that every student is assigned to her favorite(More)
We construct a price-theoretic model of integration decisions and show that these choices may adversely affect consumers, even in the absence of monopoly power in supply and product markets. Integration is costly to implement but is effective at coordinating production decisions. The price of output helps to determine the organizational form chosen: there(More)
Note: Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. Requests for single copies of a Paper will be filled by the Cowles Foundation within the limits of the supply. References in publications to Discussion Papers (other than mere acknowledgment by a writer that he has access to such(More)
The combinatorial assignment problem has three principal features: (i) agents require bundles of indivisible objects; (ii) monetary transfers are prohibited; and (iii) the market administrator cares about both e¢ ciency and fairness. An example of this problem is the assignment of course schedules to students. Impossibility theorems have established that(More)
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