Estelle Cantillon

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A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure (fixed cost and marginal cost of providing quality). We characterize the buyer’s optimal buying mechanism. We then use the optimal mechanism as a theoretical and numerical benchmark to study simpler buying(More)
Bidders’ asymmetries are widespread in auction markets. Yet, their impact on behavior and, ultimately, revenue and profits is still not well understood. This paper defines a natural benchmark auction environment to which to compare any private values auction with asymmetrically distributed valuations. The main result is that the expected revenue from the(More)
At Harvard Business School, like at many other professional schools around the country, students’ learning experience requires limits on the number of students in a class. This creates an interesting allocation problem for school administrations: students need a seat in several classes, and classes have limited capacity. In addressing this problem, all(More)
Are exchanges natural monopolies? How much does liquidity, differentiation, intermediation, and multi-homing matter to exchange competition? We answer these questions by studying competition between two exchanges over the Bund contract. The competition lasted for eight years, until the market eventually tipped in favor of the entrant. Specifically, we study(More)
We use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May’s Theorem, of variants of classic impossibility results, and of a recent result on the robustness of Majority Rule due to Maskin (1995). In each(More)