- Full text PDF available (8)
This paper considers sequencing situations with due date criteria. Three diierent t ypes of criteria are considered: the weighted penalty criterion , the weighted tardiness criterion and the completion time criterion. The main focus is on convexity of the associated cooperative games.
We present a new allocation rule for the class of balanced games: the core-center. This allocation rule selects a centrally located point within the core of a balanced game. Different interpretations supporting this solution are given and a study of its main properties is carried out.
In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i.e., 1-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et al. (1989). Moreover, we propose and characterize two simple cost… (More)
In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and¨Ozkal-Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.
We follow the path initiated in Shapley (1971) and study the geometry of the core of convex and strictly convex games. We define what we call face games and use them to study the combinatorial complexity of the core of a strictly convex game. Remarkably, we present a picture that summarizes our results with the aid of Pascal's triangle.
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, with the ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in core areas of finance. Abstract In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy… (More)