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From Boston to Chinese Parallel to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a Family of School Choice Mechanisms by Yan Chen and Onur Kesten* We characterize a parametric family of application-rejection school choice mechanisms, including the Boston and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms as special cases, and spanning the parallel mechanisms for Chinese(More)
W use an incentive-compatible economic experiment and surveys in the field at a large financial services firm to identify the norms for on-the-job behavior among financial advisers and their leaders, and the normative expectations each group has of the other. We examine whistle-blowing on a peer, an incentive clash between serving the client and earning(More)
Walking and other forms of physical activity have many health benefits, but people often fail to follow through on their own goals of being more active. To address gaps in current understanding of how to design technologysupported physical activity interventions, we conducted a randomized field experiment of a commitment device: making public announcements.(More)
Walking and other forms of physical activity have many health benefits, but people often fail to follow through on their own goals of being more active. To address gaps in current understanding of how to design technology-supported physical activity interventions, we conducted a randomized field experiment of a commitment device: making public(More)
In response to rising health care costs associated with obesity rates, some health care insurers are adopting incentivized technology-enhanced wellness programs. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the large-scale implementation of an incentivized Internet-mediated walking program for obese adults and to examine program acceptance, adherence, and(More)
Each year approximately 10 million high school seniors in China compete for 6 million seats through a centralized college admissions system. Within the last decade, many provinces have transitioned from a ‘sequential’ to a ‘parallel’ mechanism to make their admissions decisions. In this study, we characterize a parametric family of application-rejection(More)
Social norms involve observation by others and external sanctions for violations, while moral norms involve introspection and internal sanctions. We develop a simple model of individual preferences that incorporates moral and social norms. We then examine dictator choices, where we create a shared understanding by providing advice from peers with no(More)
We study how giving depends on income and luck, and how culture and information about the determinants of others’ income affect this relationship. Our data come from an experiment conducted in two countries, the US and Spain, that have different beliefs about how income inequality arises. We find that when individuals are informed about the determinants of(More)
In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) Many subjects cooperate contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) subjects often punish those others who behave unkindly, and (4) previous history usually in‡uences subjects’choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to account for these and(More)
Coordination in groups often converges to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium. In this paper we test the effect of changes to the payoff structure, focusing on the effect of increasing versus decreasing the onversus off-equilibrium payoffs, on equilibrium selection in coordination games. Our four treatments change the baseline coordination game payoff(More)