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Consequentialism, Distribution and Desert
This paper criticizes the ‘justice-adjusted’ consequentialist theory recently put forward by Fred Feldman. I argue that this theory violates two crucial requirements. Another theory, proposed byExpand
Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics
A principal aim of the branch of ethics called ‘population theory’ or ‘population ethics’ is to find a plausible welfarist axiology, capable of comparing total outcomes with respect to value.Expand
Consequentialism, Alternatives, and Actualism
Contribution au debat sur l'utilitarisme, en general, et sur le consequentialisme, en particulier, concernant la notion d'alternative et de resultat. Etablissant les criteres formels deExpand
Deliberation, Foreknowledge, and Morality as a Guide to Action
In Section 1, I rehearse some arguments for the claim that morality should be ``action-guiding', and try to state the conditions under which a moral theory is in fact action-guiding. I conclude thatExpand
Is our existence in need of further explanation
Several philosophers have argued that our cosmos is either purposely created by some rational being(s), or else just one among a vast number of actually existing cosmoi. According to John Leslie andExpand
Broome's Argument against Value Incomparability
John Broome has argued that alleged cases of value incomparability are really examples of vagueness in the betterness relation. The main premiss of his argument is ‘the collapsing principle’. I argueExpand
Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle
John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the ‘collapsing principle’. In anExpand
Aggregating Harms - Should We Kill to Avoid Headaches?
: It is plausible to claim that it is morally worse to kill an innocent person than to give any number of people a mild one-hour headache. Alaistar Norcross has argued that consequentialists, atExpand
Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value
Whether or not intrinsic valueis additively measurable is often thought todepend on the truth or falsity of G. E. Moore'sprinciple of organic unities. I argue that thetruth of this principle is,Expand
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