Eric-Jan Wagenmakers

Learn More
Human decision-making almost always takes place under time pressure. When people are engaged in activities such as shopping, driving, or playing chess, they have to continually balance the demands for fast decisions against the demands for accurate decisions. In the cognitive sciences, this balance is thought to be modulated by a response threshold, the(More)
The Akaike information criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1973) is a popular method for comparing the adequacy of multiple, possibly nonnested models. Current practice in cognitive psychology is to accept a single model on the basis of only the "raw" AIC values, making it difficult to unambiguously interpret the observed AIC differences in terms of a continuous(More)
In the field of psychology, the practice of p value null-hypothesis testing is as widespread as ever. Despite this popularity, or perhaps because of it, most psychologists are not aware of the statistical peculiarities of the p value procedure. In particular, p values are based on data that were never observed, and these hypothetical data are themselves(More)
Information about the structure of a causal system can come in the form of observational data— random samples of the system’s autonomous behavior—or interventional data—samples conditioned on the particular values of one or more variables that have been experimentally manipulated. Here we study people’s ability to infer causal structure from both(More)
In many situations, decision makers need to negotiate between the competing demands of response speed and response accuracy, a dilemma generally known as the speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT). Despite the ubiquity of SAT, the question of how neural decision circuits implement SAT has received little attention up until a year ago. We review recent studies that(More)
In perceptual decision-making, advance knowledge biases people toward choice alternatives that are more likely to be correct and more likely to be profitable. Accumulation-to-bound models provide two possible explanations for these effects: prior knowledge about the relative attractiveness of the alternatives at hand changes either the starting point of the(More)
Statistical inference in psychology has traditionally relied heavily on p-value significance testing. This approach to drawing conclusions from data, however, has been widely criticized, and two types of remedies have been advocated. The first proposal is to supplement p values with complementary measures of evidence, such as effect sizes. The second is to(More)
When people make decisions they often face opposing demands for response speed and response accuracy, a process likely mediated by response thresholds. According to the striatal hypothesis, people decrease response thresholds by increasing activation from cortex to striatum, releasing the brain from inhibition. According to the STN hypothesis, people(More)
It is a hallmark of a good model to make accurate a priori predictions to new conditions (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). This study compared 8 decision learning models with respect to their generalizability. Participants performed 2 tasks (the Iowa Gambling Task and the Soochow Gambling Task), and each model made a priori predictions by estimating the parameters(More)
The veracity of substantive research claims hinges on the way experimental data are collected and analyzed. In this article, we discuss an uncomfortable fact that threatens the core of psychology's academic enterprise: almost without exception, psychologists do not commit themselves to a method of data analysis before they see the actual data. It then(More)