Enrique Kawamura

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The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we assemble, for the first time, quantitative measures of the quality of the corporate governance and the ownership structure of 65 non-financial listed companies in Argentina with information for 2003-2004. A wide array of official and private sources was used for this purpose. In a nutshell, companies seem to be(More)
Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to(More)
We argue that US welfare would rise if unemployment insurance were to be increased for young workers and decreased for old. This is because young workers have little means to smooth consumption during unemployment, and want jobs to accumulate high-return human capital. So unemployment insurance is highly valuable to them while the induced moral hazard(More)
We analyze the effect of the projected demographic transition on the political support for social security, and equilibrium outcomes. Embedding a probabilistic-voting setup of electoral competition in the standard OLG model with capital accumulation, we find that intergenerational transfers arise in the absence of altruism, commitment, or trigger(More)
  • Martín Gonzalez-Eiras, Dirk Niepelt, +4 authors Jaume Ventura
  • 2010
We analyze the short and long run effects of demographic ageing—increased longevity and reduced fertility—on per-capita growth. The OLG model captures direct effects, working through adjustments in the savings rate, labor supply, and capital deepening, and indirect effects, working through changes of taxes, government spending components and the retirement(More)
Under two-dimensional asymmetric information, education is a noisy job-market signal, so supplementary information is needed to determine a worker’s ability. On-the-job interaction reveals a worker’s productivity to the employer. Signs like employment relationships or promotions may reveal this private information to the market. Unlike signals, a worker(More)
We provide a simple model with a privately informed principal who provides nancing to a project in which an agent exerts e ort that a ects the probability of success. When restricting the space of contracts to debt contracts, we show that the equilibrium that gives the highest pro t to the principal is a pooling equilibrium in which the allocation of cashow(More)
for any two distinct price vectors p and p' and a given distribution J.L of household characteristics. This is, after all, a condition under which the classical question of existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibrium prices in general equilibrium theory can be addressed satisfactorily. It is well known, however, that the theory of Wah-asian demand(More)
  • Federico Andrés Bugni, Daniel Aromi, +4 authors Osvaldo Schenone
This is a ...rst step towards the optimal unemployment insurance design in general equilibrium model moral hazard. It considers is a self-...nanced policy in the context of a simpli...ed version of Lucas-Prescott (1974) with unobservable search e¤ort. In this context, existence of an optimal unemployment bene...t is shown. By de...nition, this unemployment(More)