Emir Kavurmacioglu

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—Recent initiatives allow cellular providers to offer spot service of their licensed spectrum, paving the way to dynamic secondary spectrum markets. This paper characterizes market outcomes when multiple providers are drawn into competition for secondary demand. We study a game-theoretic model in which each provider aims to enhance its revenue by(More)
This paper characterizes the outcomes of secondary spectrum markets when multiple providers compete for secondary demand. We study a competition model in which each provider aims to enhance its revenue by opportunistically serving a price-dependent secondary demand, while also serving dedicated primary demand. We consider two methodologies for sharing(More)
We introduce a private commons model that consists of network providers who serve a fixed primary demand and strategically price to improve their revenues from an additional secondary demand. For <i>general</i> forms of secondary demand, we establish the existence and uniqueness of two characteristic prices: the break-even price and the market sharing(More)
We introduce an economic model for private commons that consists of network providers serving a fixed primary demand and making strategic pricing decisions to improve their revenues by providing service to a secondary demand. For general forms of secondary demand, we establish the existence and uniqueness of two critical prices for each provider: the(More)
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