Emily Tanimura

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We develop a modification of the connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that takes into account negative externalities arising from the connectivity of direct and indirect neighbors, thus combining aspects of the connections model and the co-author model. We consider a general functional form for agents' utility that incorporates both the effects(More)
We propose a mechanism for resolving bargaining problems. The mechanism allows two players to make a sequence of simultaneous propositions. At any step, as long as the players have not reached an agreement, they can choose to implement a lottery between the dierent propositions. In this aspect, the mechanism is similar to the so called nal oers arbitration.(More)
In a sequential bargaining game framework with complete information and no discounting, this paper proposes a mechanism in the spirit of a final offers arbitration (FOA). At each step, two parties may stop negotiating in order to implement a lottery between the two current proposals or go on making new proposals. A crucial difference with the FOA is that(More)
This paper presents a model of influence where agents' beliefs are based on an objective reality, such as the properties of an environment. The perception of the objective reality is not direct: all agents know is that the more correct a belief, the more successful the actions that are deduced from this belief. A pair of agents can influence eachother when(More)
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