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The question of whether knowledge is definable in terms of belief , which has played an important role in epistemology for the last fifty years, is studied here in the framework of epistemic and doxastic logics. Three notions of definability are considered: explicit definabil-ity, implicit definability, and reducibility, where explicit definability is(More)
Three notions of definability in multimodal logic are considered. Two are analogous to the notions of explicit definability and implicit definability introduced by Beth in the context of first-order logic. However , while by Beth's theorem the two types of definability are equivalent for first-order logic, such an equivalence does not hold for multi-modal(More)
The experimental evidence on the " endowment effect " (Kahneman et al. 1990) and the " self serving bias " in negotiations (Babcok and Loewenstein 1997) suggests that individuals enter a tough state of mind when they have to make a stand visa -vis somebody else. In this work we show how a toughness bias in bargaining may indeed be evolutionary viable. When(More)
We study a sequential all-pay auction where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that a¤ects their cost of e¤ort. In the case of two contestants, contestant 1 (the …rst mover) makes an e¤ort in the …rst period, while contestant 2 (the second mover) observes the e¤ort of contestant 1 and then makes an e¤ort in the(More)
Why do escalations in protracted international conflicts sometimes hasten the pace of negotiations? And why is it sometimes the case that the resulting terms of agreement were deemed unacceptable to one or both sides before the escalation? We analyze these issues in a game-theoretic setting with asymmetric information, in which the delay a party exercises(More)
This paper explores the interdependence between market structure and an important class of extra-rational cognitive biases. Starting with a familiar bilateral monopoly framework, we characterize the endogenous emergence of preference distortions during bargainging which cause negotiators to perceive their private valuations differently than they would(More)
In an environment with dynamic arrivals of players who wish to purchase only one of multiple identical objects for which they have a private value, we analyze a sequential auction mechanism with an activity rule. If the players play undominated strategies then we are able to bound the efficiency loss compared to an optimal mechanism that maximizes the total(More)
We study a sequential (Stackelberg) all-pay auction with two contestants who are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that a¤ects their cost of e¤ort. Contestant 1 (the …rst mover) exerts an e¤ort in the …rst period, while contestant 2 (the second mover) observes the e¤ort of contestant 1 and then exerts an e¤ort in the second period. Contestant 2(More)