Ella Segev

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The question of whether knowledge is definable in terms of belief , which has played an important role in epistemology for the last fifty years, is studied here in the framework of epistemic and doxastic logics. Three notions of definability are considered: explicit definabil-ity, implicit definability, and reducibility, where explicit definability is(More)
The experimental evidence on the " endowment effect " (Kahneman et al. 1990) and the " self serving bias " in negotiations (Babcok and Loewenstein 1997) suggests that individuals enter a tough state of mind when they have to make a stand visa -vis somebody else. In this work we show how a toughness bias in bargaining may indeed be evolutionary viable. When(More)
We study a sequential (Stackelberg) all-pay auction where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that a¤ects their cost of e¤ort. In the case of two contestants, contestant 1 (the …rst mover) makes an e¤ort in the …rst period, while contestant 2 (the second mover) observes the e¤ort of contestant 1 and then makes an(More)
This paper explores the interdependence between market structure and an important class of extra-rational cognitive biases. Starting with a familiar bilateral monopoly framework, we characterize the endogenous emergence of preference distortions during bargainging which cause negotiators to perceive their private valuations differently than they would(More)
Why do escalations in protracted international conflicts sometimes hasten the pace of negotiations? And why is it sometimes the case that the resulting terms of agreement were deemed unacceptable to one or both sides before the escalation? We analyze these issues in a game-theoretic setting with asymmetric information, in which the delay a party exercises(More)
In an environment with dynamic arrivals of players who wish to purchase only one of multiple identical objects for which they have a private value, we analyze a sequential auction mechanism with an activity rule. If the players play undominated strategies then we are able to bound the efficiency loss compared to an optimal mechanism that maximizes the total(More)
We study a setting of online auctions with expiring/perishable items: $K$ items are sold sequentially, buyers arrive over time and have unit-demand. The goal is to maximize the social welfare (sum of winners' values). Most previously suggested mechanisms for this model are direct-revelation. In contrast, in real-life we usually see open mechanisms, most(More)
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