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The question of whether knowledge is definable in terms of belief , which has played an important role in epistemology for the last fifty years, is studied here in the framework of epistemic and doxastic logics. Three notions of definability are considered: explicit definabil-ity, implicit definability, and reducibility, where explicit definability is(More)
Three notions of definability in multimodal logic are considered. Two are analogous to the notions of explicit definability and implicit definability introduced by Beth in the context of first-order logic. However , while by Beth's theorem the two types of definability are equivalent for first-order logic, such an equivalence does not hold for multi-modal(More)
The experimental evidence on the " endowment effect " (Kahneman et al. 1990) and the " self serving bias " in negotiations (Babcok and Loewenstein 1997) suggests that individuals enter a tough state of mind when they have to make a stand visa -vis somebody else. In this work we show how a toughness bias in bargaining may indeed be evolutionary viable. When(More)
We study a sequential all-pay auction where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that a¤ects their cost of e¤ort. In the case of two contestants, contestant 1 (the …rst mover) makes an e¤ort in the …rst period, while contestant 2 (the second mover) observes the e¤ort of contestant 1 and then makes an e¤ort in the(More)
This paper explores the interdependence between market structure and an important class of extra-rational cognitive biases. Starting with a familiar bilateral monopoly framework, we characterize the endogenous emergence of preference distortions during bargainging which cause negotiators to perceive their private valuations differently than they would(More)
We study a sequential (Stackelberg) all-pay auction with two contestants who are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that a¤ects their cost of e¤ort. Contestant 1 (the …rst mover) exerts an e¤ort in the …rst period, while contestant 2 (the second mover) observes the e¤ort of contestant 1 and then exerts an e¤ort in the second period. Contestant 2(More)
Why do escalations in protracted international conflicts sometimes hasten the pace of negotiations? And why is it sometimes the case that the resulting terms of agreement were deemed unacceptable to one or both sides before the escalation? We analyze these issues in a game-theoretic setting with asymmetric information, in which the delay a party exercises(More)
As part of the process of updating the National List of Health Services in Israel, health plans (the ‘payers’) and manufacturers each provide estimates on the expected number of patients that will utilize a new drug. Currently, payers face major financial consequences when actual utilization is higher than the allocated budget. We suggest a risk-sharing(More)
Consumers often consult the reviews of their peers when deciding whether to purchase a new experience good; however, their initial quality expectations are typically set by the product’s observable attributes. This paper focuses on the implications of social learning for a monopolist firm’s choice of product design. In our model, the firm’s design choice(More)