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I provide a definition of the Banks set, or set of sophisticated voting outcomes, over an infinite policy space and when individual preferences are weak. I also show that the Banks set is a subset of one definition of the uncovered set, but not another. The interpretation of the Banks set in this setting differs from Banks's original interpretation in the(More)
Depression is a potentially life-threatening disorder affecting millions of people across the globe. It is a huge burden to both the individual and society, costing over £9 billion in 2000 alone: the World Health Organisation (WHO) cited it as the third leading cause of global disability in 2004 (first in the developed world), and project it will be the(More)
Different definitions of the uncovered set are commonly, and often interchangeably, used in the literature. If we assume individual preferences are strict over all alternatives, these definitions are equivalent. However , if one or more voters is indifferent between alternatives these definitions may not yield the same uncovered set. This note examines how(More)
This paper examines the role that political institutions play in inducing or subduing ethnic identification. I provide a formal model of ethnic identification as a function of institutional design and social context that focuses on one question: what kinds of institutions will induce individuals to identify with the state rather than along ethnic lines?(More)
This article considers environments in which individual preferences are single-peaked with respect to an unspecified, but unidimensional, ordering of the alternative space. We show that in these environments, any institution that is coalitionally strategy-proof must be dictatorial. Thus, any nondictatorial institutional environment that does not explicitly(More)
In this paper, we model a legislative calendar as an ordered list of issues to be considered in sequence. We present two equilibrium models of legislative scheduling, one presuming that the calendar is itself the object of collective choice and the other considering which calendars are immune from " discharge " (the change of at most one element of the(More)
Agenda control in legislative bodies is an important and complicated topic. Frequently, the discussion of agenda control is limited to procedures that restrict what may be considered on the floor, as exemplified by " closed rules " in the United States House of Representatives. In this paper, we expand the discussion of agenda control by considering the(More)
This paper considers manipulation of collective choice – in such environments, a potential alternative is powerful only to the degree that its introduction can affect the collective decision. Using the Banks set (Banks [1985]), we present and characterize alternatives that can, and those that can not, affect sophisticated collective decision making. Along(More)