Elizabeth Maggie Penn

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Depression is a potentially life-threatening disorder affecting millions of people across the globe. It is a huge burden to both the individual and society, costing over £9 billion in 2000 alone: the World Health Organisation (WHO) cited it as the third leading cause of global disability in 2004 (first in the developed world), and project it will be the(More)
Different definitions of the uncovered set are commonly, and often interchangeably, used in the literature. If we assume individual preferences are strict over all alternatives, these definitions are equivalent. However , if one or more voters is indifferent between alternatives these definitions may not yield the same uncovered set. This note examines how(More)
For any weakly Paretian preference aggregation rule defined on the domain of all single-peaked preferences over a finite set of at least 3 alternatives, satisfaction of independence of irrelevant alternatives implies that the preference aggregation rule is neutral (i.e., it does not depend upon the labels of the alternatives). The result is briefly related(More)
This paper examines the role that political institutions play in inducing or subduing ethnic identification. I provide a formal model of ethnic identification as a function of institutional design and social context that focuses on one question: what kinds of institutions will induce individuals to identify with the state rather than along ethnic lines?(More)
  • Elizabeth Maggie Penn, David Austen-Smith, Kim Border, John Duggan, Matthew Jackson, Jonathan Katz +4 others
  • 2008
In this paper I analyze a 3-person voting game in which players sequentially choose amendments to a bill and then vote sophisticatedly on the resulting agenda. This game differs from previous work on endogenous agenda formation in that the number of items on the agenda is not fixed. Players keep making proposals until they can do no better. I find that(More)
This article considers environments in which individual preferences are single-peaked with respect to an unspecified, but unidimensional, ordering of the alternative space. We show that in these environments, any institution that is coalitionally strategy-proof must be dictatorial. Thus, any nondictatorial institutional environment that does not explicitly(More)