Elia Zardini

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If P , doesn’t it follow that ‘P ’ is true? And if ‘P ’ is true, doesn’t it follow that P? Well, that arguably depends. If I am hungry, it does not follow that your utterance of the sentence ‘I am hungry’ is true—you might well not be hungry, in which case your utterance would intuitively be false. It is not even clear whether and in what sense it follows(More)
I want to address a foundational issue in the contemporary vagueness debate. This is very much dominated by three main approaches—semantic, epistemic and psychological— which, however distinct they may be in other respects, share a crucial common feature, namely that of characterizing vagueness in terms of the notion of borderlineness. These approaches(More)
The naive approach to vagueness maintains that the nature of the vagueness of an expression basically consists in its not having boundaries between positive and negative cases of application in an appropriate ordering (a “soritical series”), whilst having both positive and negative cases in it. The naive approach is contrasted with the nowadays dominant(More)
In the last few years there has been a resurgence of interest in Moore's Proof of the existence of an external world, which is now often rendered as follows: 1 (I) Here's a hand (II) If there is a hand here, there is an external world Therefore (III) There is an external world The contemporary debate has been mostly triggered by Crispin Wright's(More)
A notion of truth as applicable to events of fact-stating use (utterances) of a sentence type is arguably presupposed and required by our evaluative practices of the use of language. The truth of an utterance clearly depends on what the utterance says. This fundamental dependence seems to be captured by the schema that if an utterance u says that P , then u(More)
Commentators on vagueness have identified a series of phenomena correlated to an expression ε’s being vague. Prominent among these are: ε must present possible borderline cases of its application (borderlineness); it must seem that, if ε is true of a case, it is also true of every qualitatively very similar case (sorites susceptibility); the sharp cutoff(More)