• Publications
  • Influence
Learning-by-Doing in the Newsvendor Problem: A Laboratory Investigation of the Role of Experience and Feedback
We investigate learning by doing in the newsvendor inventory problem. An earlier study observed that decision makers tend to anchor their orders around average demand and fail to adjust sufficiently
How Effective are Online Reputation Mechanisms? An Experimental Study
It is found that while the feedback mechanism induces quite a substantial improvement in transaction efficiency, it also exhibits a kind of public goods problem in that, unlike in the partners market, the benefits of trust and trustworthy behavior go to the whole community and are not completely internalized.
Contracting in Supply Chains: A Laboratory Investigation
This work compares the performance of three commonly studied supply chain contracting mechanisms: the wholesale price contract, the buyback contract, and the revenue-sharing contract in a laboratory setting using a novel design that fully controls for strategic interactions between the retailer and the supplier.
Order stability in supply chains: : coordination risk and the role of coordination stock
The bullwhip effect describes the tendency for the variance of orders in supply chains to increase as one moves upstream from consumer demand. Previous research attributes this phenomenon to both
Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness
A hypothetical decision procedure is proposed, based on the notion that dictator giving originates with personal and social rules that effectively constrain self-interested behavior, that provides a link between dictator behavior and a broader class of laboratory phenomena.
Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
This work investigates the effect of regret-related feedback information on bidding behavior in sealed-bid first-price auctions and finds strong support for both predictions.
Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller’s revenue in Dutch auctions
Abstract We study the role of timing in auctions under the premise that time is a valuable resource. When one object is for sale, Dutch and first-price sealed bid auctions are strategically
Designing Buyback Contracts for Irrational But Predictable Newsvendors
This paper demonstrates that ordering decisions also systematically depend on individual contract parameters and develops a behavioral model that captures this systematic behavior and test the approach in out-of-sample validation experiments that confirm that contracts designed using the behavioral model perform better than contracts designed with the standard model.