Eitan Moshe Goldman

Learn More
  • Eitan Goldman, Jörg Rocholl, Jongil So, Paolo Fulghieri, Matthias Kahl, Jonathan Karpoff +2 others
  • 2008
This paper analyzes whether political connections of public corporations in the United States affect the allocation of government procurement contracts. The paper classifies the political affiliation of S&P 500 companies using hand-collected data that detail the past political position of each of their board members. Using this classification, the study(More)
  • Richard B Evans, Christopher C Geczy, David K Musto, Adam V Reed, Michael Brandt, Greg Brown +8 others
  • 2003
Regulations allow market makers to short sell without borrowing stock, and the transactions of a major options market maker show that in most hard-to-borrow situations, it chooses not to borrow and instead fails to deliver stock to its buyers. Some of the value of failing passes through to option prices: when failing is cheaper than borrowing, the relation(More)
  • Eitan Goldman, Jun Qian, Franklin Allen, John Core, Cliff Holderness, Edie Hotchkiss +6 others
  • 2004
In this paper we offer an explanation for the empirical anomaly that most raiders do not acquire the maximum possible toehold prior to announcing a takeover bid. By endogenously modeling the target value following an unsuccessful takeover we demonstrate that a raider may optimally choose to acquire a small toehold even if the toehold acquisition does not(More)
  • Lauren Cohen, Joshua Coval, Christopher Malloy, Stephen Ansolabehere, Malcolm Baker, Utpal Bhattacharya +27 others
  • 2010
United States Congress for helpful comments and discussions. We are grateful to Diego Garcia and Oyvind Norli for providing data on geographic locations of firm operations. We also thank David Kim for excellent research assistance. We are grateful for funding from the National Science Foundation. ABSTRACT This paper employs a new empirical approach for(More)
We examine firm managers' incentives to commit fraud in a model where firms seek funding from investors and investors can monitor firms at a cost in order to get more precise information about firm prospects. We show that fraud incentives are highest when business conditions are good, but not too good: in exceptionally good times, even weaker firms can get(More)
  • Cristina Cella, Andrew Ellul, Mariassunta Giannetti, Utpal Bhattacharya, Josh Coval, Eitan Goldman +11 others
  • 2010
After negative shocks, investors with short trading horizons are inclined or forced to sell their holdings to a larger extent than investors with longer trading horizons. This may amplify the effects of market-wide shocks on stock prices. We test the relevance of this mechanism by exploiting the negative shock caused by Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy in(More)
  • Hung-Chia Hsu, Adam V Reed, J Org, Rocholl, Ken Ahern, Diane Del Guercio +12 others
  • 2010
We analyze the effect of initial public offerings (IPOs) on industry competitors and provide evidence that companies experience negative stock price reactions to completed IPOs in their industry and positive stock price reactions to their withdrawal. Following a successful IPO in their industry, they show significant deterioration in their operating(More)
  • Eitan Goldman, Greg Brown, Henry Cao, Jennifer Conrad, Ron Kaniel, Steve Slezak
  • 2002
We analyze the impact of organizational form on the incentive of market participants to collect value relevant information about divisions of the firm. We explore whether the market collects less information about divisions of a multi division firm relative to the case in which each division trades as a separate firm. We find that organizational form has a(More)
  • Urs C Peyer, Anil Shivdasani, Jennifer Conrad, Claudio Loderer, Henri Servaes, Steve Slezak +7 others
  • 2001
– This study tests the proposition that firms that make efficient use of their internal capital markets can lower the cost of transacting in the external capital market. Using a large panel data set of diversified firms from 1980–1998, I show that diversified firms with an efficient internal capital allocation display a higher propensity to use external(More)
  • Alexander Borisov, Eitan Goldman, Nandini Gupta, N K Chidambaram, Ray Fisman, Andrew Lo +4 others
  • 2012
Does the stock market consider lobbying expenditures to be a value-enhancing investment for firms? Is there truth to the popular view that lobbying adds value by facilitating corruption? In 2006, top lobbyist Jack Abramoff pleaded guilty to the bribery of government officials, which generated intense scrutiny of corruption in the lobbying process. Using(More)