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This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable matching. This implies that, starting from any unstable matching,(More)
When resources are divided among agents, the characteristics of the agents are taken into consideration. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, where the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm is divided among the creditors based on their claims. We characterize division rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by(More)
* I would like to thank Tayfun Sönmez, an anonymous associate editor, and especially an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. This paper is a revised version of the paper entitled " Collusion-Proof Mechanisms for Matching Problems. " 1 Abstract We study house allocation problems introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We prove that a(More)
The folk theorem literature has been relaxing the assumption on how much players know about each other's past action. Here we consider a general model where players can " buy " precise information. Every period, each player decides whether to pay a cost to accurately observe the actions chosen by other players in the previous period. When a player does not(More)
This paper studies optimal nonlinear pricing for a monopolist when consumers' preferences exhibit temptation and self-control as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001a). Consumers are subject to temptation inside the store but exercise self-control, and those foreseeing large self-control costs do not enter the store. Consumers differ in their preferences under(More)
The centipede game is one of the most celebrated examples of the paradox of backward induction. Experiments of the centipede game have been conducted in various settings: two-person games with linearly increasing payoffs (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992), two-person games with constant-sum payoffs (Fey, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996) and three-person games(More)