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This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching , there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable matching. This implies that, starting from any unstable… (More)

- Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, +5 authors Roger Myerson
- 2010

We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms when common knowledge of the state of Nature is relaxed to common p-beliefs about it. We show that with even an arbitrarily small amount of such uncertainty, the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and in addition there are sequential equilibria with… (More)

- Eiichi Miyagawa
- Social Choice and Welfare
- 2001

- Biung-Ghi Ju, Eiichi Miyagawa, Toyotaka Sakai
- J. Economic Theory
- 2007

When resources are divided among agents, the characteristics of the agents are taken into consideration. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, where the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm is divided among the creditors based on their claims. We characterize division rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by… (More)

- Toshiji KAWAGOE, Hirokazu TAKIZAWA, +7 authors James E. Parco
- 2008

The centipede game is one of the most celebrated examples of the paradox of backward induction. Experiments of the centipede game have been conducted in various settings: two-person games with linearly increasing payoffs (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992), two-person games with constant-sum payoffs (Fey, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996) and three-person games… (More)

- Bettina Klaus, Eiichi Miyagawa
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2002

- Eiichi Miyagawa
- J. Economic Theory
- 2001

We consider the Shapley-Scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed. We characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy-proof, ex post individually rational, ex post budget balanced, and " collusion-proof. " In these mechanisms, the price of each object is fixed in advance, and the objects are reallocated according to the… (More)

- Eiichi Miyagawa
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2002

* I would like to thank Tayfun Sönmez, an anonymous associate editor, and especially an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. This paper is a revised version of the paper entitled " Collusion-Proof Mechanisms for Matching Problems. " 1 Abstract We study house allocation problems introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We prove that a… (More)

- Eiichi Miyagawa, Yasuyuki Miyahara, Tadashi Sekiguchi
- J. Economic Theory
- 2008

The folk theorem literature has been relaxing the assumption on how much players know about each other's past action. Here we consider a general model where players can " buy " precise information. Every period, each player decides whether to pay a cost to accurately observe the actions chosen by other players in the previous period. When a player does not… (More)

- Eiichi Miyagawa
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2002

This paper provides simple four-stage game forms that fully implement a large class of two-person bargaining solutions in subgame-perfect equilibrium. The solutions that can be implemented by our game forms are those that maximize a monotonic and quasi-concave function of utilities after normalizing each agent's utility function so that the maximum utility… (More)