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This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching , there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable matching. This implies that, starting from any unstable… (More)

- Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Richard Holden, Takashi Kunimoto, Olivier Tercieux, Hitoshi Matsushima +2 others
- 2010

We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms when common knowledge of the state of Nature is relaxed to common p-beliefs about it. We show that with even an arbitrarily small amount of such uncertainty, the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and in addition there are sequential equilibria with… (More)

When resources are divided among agents, the characteristics of the agents are taken into consideration. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, where the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm is divided among the creditors based on their claims. We characterize division rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by… (More)

- Toshiji KAWAGOE, Hirokazu TAKIZAWA, Vincent Crawford, Eiichi Miyagawa, Robert Östling, Amnon Rapoport +4 others
- 2008

The centipede game is one of the most celebrated examples of the paradox of backward induction. Experiments of the centipede game have been conducted in various settings: two-person games with linearly increasing payoffs (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992), two-person games with constant-sum payoffs (Fey, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996) and three-person games… (More)

* I would like to thank Tayfun Sönmez, an anonymous associate editor, and especially an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. This paper is a revised version of the paper entitled " Collusion-Proof Mechanisms for Matching Problems. " 1 Abstract We study house allocation problems introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We prove that a… (More)

We consider the Shapley-Scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed. We characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy-proof, ex post individually rational, ex post budget balanced, and " collusion-proof. " In these mechanisms, the price of each object is fixed in advance, and the objects are reallocated according to the… (More)

The folk theorem literature has been relaxing the assumption on how much players know about each other's past action. Here we consider a general model where players can " buy " precise information. Every period, each player decides whether to pay a cost to accurately observe the actions chosen by other players in the previous period. When a player does not… (More)

This paper provides simple four-stage game forms that fully implement a large class of two-person bargaining solutions in subgame-perfect equilibrium. The solutions that can be implemented by our game forms are those that maximize a monotonic and quasi-concave function of utilities after normalizing each agent's utility function so that the maximum utility… (More)