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When resources are divided among agents, the characteristics of the agents are taken into consideration. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, where the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm is divided among the creditors based on their claims. We characterize division rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by(More)
The folk theorem literature has been relaxing the assumption on how much players know about each other's past action. Here we consider a general model where players can " buy " precise information. Every period, each player decides whether to pay a cost to accurately observe the actions chosen by other players in the previous period. When a player does not(More)
* I would like to thank Tayfun Sönmez, an anonymous associate editor, and especially an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. This paper is a revised version of the paper entitled " Collusion-Proof Mechanisms for Matching Problems. " 1 Abstract We study house allocation problems introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We prove that a(More)
This paper studies optimal nonlinear pricing for a monopolist when consumers' preferences exhibit temptation and self-control as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001a). Consumers are subject to temptation inside the store but exercise self-control, and those foreseeing large self-control costs do not enter the store. Consumers differ in their preferences under(More)
Gale and Shapley's matching model has a " stable matching, " where no pair of a firm and a worker prefer each other. The main application has been a one-time matching with a centralized matchmaking mechanism. However, not many job markets are centralized, and participants may remain active in the market even after they are matched. This paper studies an(More)
We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations. First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the(More)
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