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We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms when common knowledge of the state of Nature is relaxed to common p-beliefs about it. We show that with even an arbitrarily small amount of such uncertainty, the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and in addition there are sequential equilibria with(More)
Two similar gram-positive rods were isolated from 10(-6) dilutions of ruminal fluid from a sheep receiving a mixed grass hay/concentrate diet, using a medium containing pancreatic casein hydrolysate as sole source of carbon and energy. The isolates did not ferment sugars, but grew on pyruvate or trypticase, forming caproate as the main fermentation product(More)
When resources are divided among agents, the characteristics of the agents are taken into consideration. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, where the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm is divided among the creditors based on their claims. We characterize division rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by(More)
The centipede game is one of the most celebrated examples of the paradox of backward induction. Experiments of the centipede game have been conducted in various settings: two-person games with linearly increasing payoffs (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992), two-person games with constant-sum payoffs (Fey, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996) and three-person games(More)
Eubacterium pyruvativorans I-6(T) is a non-saccharolytic, amino-acid-fermenting anaerobe from the rumen, isolated by its ability to grow on pancreatic casein hydrolysate (PCH) as sole C source. This study investigated its metabolic properties and its likely ecological niche. Additional growth was supported by pyruvate, vinyl acetate, and, to a lesser(More)
We consider the Shapley-Scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed. We characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy-proof, ex post individually rational, ex post budget balanced, and " collusion-proof. " In these mechanisms, the price of each object is fixed in advance, and the objects are reallocated according to the(More)
* I would like to thank Tayfun Sönmez, an anonymous associate editor, and especially an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. This paper is a revised version of the paper entitled " Collusion-Proof Mechanisms for Matching Problems. " 1 Abstract We study house allocation problems introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We prove that a(More)