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The Complexity of Safe Manipulation under Scoring Rules
TLDR
We answer an open question of [Hazon and Elkind, 2010] by presenting a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a safe strategic vote under the Borda rule. Expand
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Grammar Logics in Nested Sequent Calculus: Proof Theory and Decision Procedures
TLDR
A grammar logic refers to an extension of the multi-modal logic K in which the modal axioms are generated from a formal grammar. Expand
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How should we score athletes and candidates: geometric scoring rules
TLDR
We study whether scoring rules can be robust to adding or deleting particular candidates, as occurs with spoilers in political elections and with athletes in sports due to doping allegations. Expand
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Complexity of Equivalence Relations and Preorders from Computability Theory
TLDR
We study the relative complexity of equivalence relations and preorders from computability theory and complexity theory. Expand
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The complexity of decision problems about equilibria in two-player Boolean games
TLDR
A mixed strategy can hold enough information to encode the computation history of an exponential time Turing machine. Expand
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∃GUARANTEENASH for Boolean games is NEXP-Hard
TLDR
We show that a natural decision problem about mixed equilibria: determining whether a Boolean game has a mixed strategy equilibrium that guarantees every player a given payoff, is NEXP-hard. Expand
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Computable Component-wise Reducibility
TLDR
We consider equivalence relations and preorders complete for various levels of the arithmetical hierarchy under computable, component-wise reducibility. Expand
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Cake Cutting Mechanisms
TLDR
We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. Expand
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Complexity of mixed equilibria in Boolean games
TLDR
Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games wherein a player seeks to satisfy a formula of propositional logic by selecting a truth assignment to a set of variables under his control. Expand
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Electing a committee with dominance constraints
TLDR
We consider the problem of electing a committee of $k$ candidates, subject to some constraints as to what this committee is supposed to look like. Expand
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