Egor Ianovski

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[Slinko and White, 2008] have recently introduced a new model of coalitional manipulation of voting rules under limited communication, which they call safe strategic voting. The computational aspects of this model were first studied by [Hazon and Elkind, 2010], who provide polynomial-time algorithms for finding a safe strategic vote under kapproval and the(More)
We study the relative complexity of equivalence relations and preorders from computability theory and complexity theory. Given binary relations R,S, a componentwise reducibility is defined by R ≤ S ⇐⇒ ∃f ∀x, y [xRy ↔ f(x)Sf(y)]. Here f is taken from a suitable class of effective functions. For us the relations will be on natural numbers, and f must be(More)
A grammar logic refers to an extension to the multi-modal logic K in which the modal axioms are generated from a formal grammar. We consider a proof theory, in nested sequent calculus, of grammar logics with converse, i.e., every modal operator [a] comes with a converse [a]−1. Extending previous works on nested sequent systems for tense logics, we show all(More)
Boolean games are an expressive and natural formalism through which to investigate problems of strategic interaction in multiagent systems. Although they have been widely studied, almost all previous work on Nash equilibria in Boolean games has focused on the restricted setting of pure strategies. This is a shortcoming as finite games are guaranteed to have(More)
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is a cornerstone of social choice theory, stating that an onto social choice function cannot be both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial if the number of alternatives is at least three. The Duggan-Schwartz theorem proves an analogue in the case of set-valued elections: if the function is onto with respect to singletons, and(More)
The Duggan-Schwartz theorem [Duggan and Schwartz, 1992] is a famous result concerning strategy-proof social choice correspondences, often stated as “A social choice correspondence that can be manipulated by neither an optimist nor a pessimist has a weak dictator”. However, this formulation is actually due to Taylor [2002], and the original theorem, at face(More)
We show that the following problem is EXP-complete: given a rational v and a two player, zero-sum Boolean gameG determine whether the value of G is at least v. The proof is via a translation of the proof of the same result for Boolean circuit games in [1]. 1 Preliminaries We will be using the encoding of [2] to replicate the proof of [1]. A familiarity with(More)
Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games wherein a player seeks to satisfy a formula of propositional logic by selecting a truth assignment to a set of propositional variables under his control. The difficulty arises because a player does not necessarily control every variable on which his formula depends, hence the satisfaction of his(More)