Egbert Dierker

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We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-regarding preferences. We identify a separability condition on monotone preferences that is necessary and sufficient for one’s own demand to be independent of the allocations and characteristics of other agents in the economy. Given separability, it is impossible to identify(More)
We analyze an overlapping generations model with fixed costs of stock market participation. Participation in the stock market is determined endogenously and covaries positively with preceding innovations in dividends. The equilibrium share price is positively related to market participation of the same period and to information about future dividends. There(More)
We consider economies with incomplete markets, production, and a given distribution of initial endowments. The main purpose of the paper is to present a robust example of an economy with only one firm and one good per state in which no production decision entails a constrained efficient outcome. In particular, the unique Drèze equilibrium is dominated by(More)
We consider a firm acting strategically on behalf of its shareholders. The price normalization problem arising in general equilibrium models of imperfect competition can be overcome by using the concept of real wealth maximization. This concept is based on shareholders’ aggregate demand and does not involve any utility comparisons. We explore the efficiency(More)
This paper surveys the literature in which non cooperative game theory has been applied to empirical industrial organization. We concentrate on the research on structure and performance since game theory made its most profound inroads in this field and in industrial organisation in general, and while it now spreads to all other fields in economics empirical(More)
We consider an economy with incomplete markets and a single firm and assume that utility can be freely transferred in the form of the initially available good 0 (quasilinearity). In this particularly simple and transparent framework, the objective of a firm can be defined as the maximization of the total utility of its control group C measured in units of(More)
We consider economies with incomplete markets, one good per state, private ownership of initial endowments, a single firm, and no assets other than shares in this firm. In this simple framework, arbitrarily small income effects can render every market equilibrium resulting from some production decision constrained inefficient. Thus, even if all utility(More)
We consider a simple model of a firm acting strategically on behalf of its shareholders. The price normalization problem arising in general equilibrium models of imperfect competition is overcome by using the concept of real wealth maximization. This concept is based on shareholders’ aggregate demand and does not involve any comparison of utility profiles(More)
We consider economies with incomplete markets, one good per state, two periods, t = 0, 1, private ownership of initial endowments, a single firm, and no assets other than shares in this firm. In Dierker, Dierker, Grodal (2002), we give an example of such an economy in which all market equilibria are constrained inefficient. In this paper, we weaken the(More)
We consider economies with incomplete markets, one good per state, two periods, t = 0, 1, private ownership of initial endowments, a single firm, and no assets other than shares in this firm. In Dierker, Dierker, Grodal (2002), we give an example of such an economy in which all market equilibria are constrained inefficient. In this paper, we weaken the(More)