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We put forward a zero-knowledge based definition of privacy. Our notion is strictly stronger than the notion of differential privacy and is particularly attractive when modeling privacy in social networks. We furthermore demonstrate that it can be meaningfully achieved for tasks such as computing averages, fractions, histograms, and a variety of graph(More)
We introduce a new definition of privacy called crowd-blending privacy that strictly relaxes the notion of differential privacy. Roughly speaking, k-crowd blending private sanitization of a database requires that each individual i in the database " blends " with k other individuals j in the database, in the sense that the output of the sanitizer is "(More)
Goldreich and Oren (JoC'94) show that only trivial languages have 2-message zero-knowledge arguments. In this note we consider weaker, super-polynomial-time simulation (SPS), notions of zero-knowledge. We present barriers to using black-box reductions for demonstrating soundness of 2-message protocols with efficient prover strategies satisfying SPS(More)
We introduce a generalization of differential privacy called tailored differential privacy, where an individual's privacy parameter is " tailored " for the individual based on the individual's data and the data set. In this paper, we focus on a natural instance of tailored differential privacy, which we call outlier privacy: an individual's privacy(More)
How do we test if a weather forecaster actually knows something about whether it will rain or not? Intuitively, a "good" forecast test should be <i>complete</i>---namely, a forecaster knowing the distribution of Nature should be able to pass the test with high probability, and <i>sound</i>---an uninformed forecaster should only be able to pass the test with(More)
Recently, there has been a number of papers relating mechanism design and privacy (e.g., see [MT07, Xia11, CCK + 11, NST12, NOS12, HK12]). All of these papers consider a worst-case setting where there is no probabilistic information about the players' types. In this paper, we investigate mechanism design and privacy in the Bayesian setting, where the(More)
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. Similar impossibility results hold even if we consider a weaker notion of strategy-proofness where voters believe that the other voters' preferences are i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed). In this(More)
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that every strategy-proof voting rule with at least three possible candidates must be dictatorial. In [McL11], McLennan showed that a similar impossibility result holds even if we consider a weaker notion of strategy-proofness where voters believe that the other voters' preferences are i.i.d. (independent and(More)
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