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- Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis, Maria Polukarov, Nicholas R. Jennings
- J. Artif. Intell. Res.
- 2010
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome o f a c alition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that con sists of disjoint coalitions. However, in… (More)
- Georgios Chalkiadakis, Edith Elkind, Michael Wooldridge
- Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
- 2011
Find loads of the computational aspects of cooperative game theory edith elkind book catalogues in this site as the choice of you visiting this page. You can also join to the website book library… (More)
- Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii M. Slinko
- AAMAS
- 2014
The goal of this paper is to propose and study properties of multiwinner voting rules (with a particular focus on rules based in some way on single-winner scoring rules). We consider, e.g., SNTV,… (More)
- Edith Elkind, Amit Sahai, Kenneth Steiglitz
- SODA
- 2004
We consider the problem of picking (buying) an inexpensive s -- t path in a graph where edges are owned by independent (selfish) agents, and the cost of an edge is known to its owner only. We study… (More)
- Yvo Desmedt, Edith Elkind
- EC
- 2010
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are… (More)
- Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko
- SAGT
- 2009
In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes in order to get her preferred candidate elected. We… (More)
- Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, +4 authors Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
- SAGT
- 2009
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core—the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to… (More)
- Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind
- AAMAS
- 2008
In this paper, we study false-name manipulations in weighted voting games. Weighted voting is a well-known model of cooperation among agents in decision-making domains. In such games, each of the… (More)
- Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, Michael Wooldridge
- Math. Log. Q.
- 2008
Coalitional games raise a number of important questions from the point of view of computer science, key among them being how to represent such games compactly, and how to efficiently compute solution… (More)
We consider a setting where we have to organize one or several group activities for a group of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity; her preference over activities generally… (More)