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Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge
Abstract Game-theoretic analysis often leads to consideration of an infinite hierarchy of beliefs for each player. Harsanyi suggested that such a hierarchy of beliefs could be summarized in a singleExpand
Ž. We extend Kreps’ 1979 analysis of preference for flexibility, reinterpreted by Kreps Ž. 1992 as a model of unforeseen contingencies. We enrich the choice set, consequently obtaining uniquenessExpand
Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
We discuss the unity between the two standard approaches to noncooperative solution concepts for games. The decision-theoretic approach starts from the assumption that the rationality of the playersExpand
Interim Correlated Rationalizability
This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set ofExpand
Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
Conventional Bayesian theory of choice under uncertainty, subjective expected utility theory, fails to satisfy the properties of admissibility and existence of well-defined conditional probabilities;Expand
Standard state-space models preclude unawareness
We show that a very broad class of models, including possibility correspondences, necessarily fail to capture very simple and intuitive implications of unawareness. We explain why standardExpand
Evolution of Preferences
We model, using evolutionary game theory, the implications of endogenous determination of preferences over the outcomes of any given two-player normal form game, G. We consider a large populationExpand
An axiomatic characterization of preferences under uncertainty: Weakening the independence axiom
Abstract The independence axiom used to derive the expected utility representation of preferences over lotteries is replaced by requiring only convexity, in terms of probability mixtures, ofExpand
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty
Abstract The iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies has been advanced as a necessary requirement for “rational” play. However, this requirement relies on the assumption that the playersExpand
Temptation-Driven Preferences
“My own behavior baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe.” Saint Paul What behavior can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent facesExpand