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ous seminar audiences and Drew Fudenberg and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. Dekel and Rustichini thank the NSF and Lipman thanks SSHRCC for financial support for this research. Lipman also thanks Northwestern and Carnegie Mellon for their hospitality while this work was in progress. This paper was previously titled " A Unique Subjective(More)
The equilibria of certain simultaneous-move normal form and Bayesian games are extensively robust when the number of players is large. Even if played sequentially, with information partially and differentialy revealed, with revision and commitment possibilities, with cheap talk announcements and more, the equilibria of the simultaneous-move one-shot game(More)
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and three anonymous referees for comments and Tel–Aviv University for its hospitality during part of the work on this paper. Dekel thanks the NSF and Lipman thanks SSHRCC for financial support for this research. Dekel and Lipman particularly thank Phil Reny for a series of discussions which led to this project. This paper was formerly titled " Possibility(More)
This paper analyzes a model of decision under ambiguity, deemed vector expected utility or VEU. According to the proposed model, an act f : Ω → X is evaluated via the functional V (f) = Ω u • f dp + A Ω u • f dm , where u : X → is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, p is a baseline probability measure, Ω u • f dm is a adjustment vector of finite or(More)
I rst show that if there are more than two potential candidates in the Hotelling{ Downs model of the simultaneous choice of positions by politicians then an equilibrium fails to exist in a wide range of situations. Subsequently I study a temporal model in which candidates are free to act whenever they wish. For the case of three potential candidates I nd(More)
We identify a new way of ordering functions, called the interval dominance order, that generalizes both the single crossing property and a standard condition used in statistical decision theory. This allows us to provide a unified treatment of the major theorems on monotone comparative statics with and without uncertainty, the comparison of signal(More)
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) (henceforth DLR) axiomatically characterized three representations of preferences that allow for a desire for flexibility and/or commitment. In one of these representations (ordinal expected utility), the independence axiom is stated in a weaker form than is necessary to obtain the representation; in another (additive(More)