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If individuals care about their status, defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one " positional " good, then the consumer's problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others. In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good. Using techniques from(More)
We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global convergence(More)
Fictitious play and " gradient " learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behaviour can be qualitatively different from learning at the level of the individual. This aggregate dynamic belongs to the same class of simply defined dynamic as do several(More)
This paper investigates the properties of the most common form of reinforcement learning (the " basic model " of Erev and Roth, American Economic Review, 88, 848-881, 1998). Stochastic approximation theory has been used to analyse the local stability of fixed points under this learning process. However, as we show, when such points are on the boundary of(More)
Previous data from experiments on market entry games, N —player games where each player faces a choice between entering a market and staying out, appear inconsistent with either mixed or pure Nash equilibria. Here we show that, in this class of game, learning theory predicts sorting, that is, in the long run, agents play a pure strategy equilibrium with(More)
People with High-Functioning Autism, or Asperger's Syndrome (AS), are characterised by significantly impaired social understanding. Virtual environments may provide the ideal method for social skills training because many of the confusing inputs in 'real world' interactions can be removed. This paper outlines the rationale and methodology of the AS(More)
A new method is proposed for the analysis of first price and all pay auctions, where bidding functions are written not as functions of values but as functions of the rank or quantile of the bidder's value in the distribution from which it was drawn. This method gives new results in both symmetric and asymmetric cases with independent values. It is shown(More)
We report laboratory experiments that use new, visually oriented software to explore the dynamics of 3 × 3 games with intransitive best responses. Each moment, each player is matched against the entire population, here 8 human subjects. A " heat map " offers instantaneous feedback on current profit opportunities. In the continuous slow adjustment treatment,(More)
We consider a tournament arising out of a matching market. On one side of the market, aspirants who are differentiated in ability choose a level of output. Under assortative matching, higher output leads to a better match. Thus, rather than a " winner-take-all " tournament, there are multiple ranked rewards. That is, the participant with the highest output(More)
We propose a new concept for the analysis of games, the TASP, which gives a precise prediction about non-equilibrium play in games whose Nash equilib-ria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like learning processes. We show that, when players learn using weighted stochastic fictitious play and so place greater weight on more recent experience,(More)