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Power analysis attacks - revealing the secrets of smart cards
This volume explains how power analysis attacks work and provides an extensive discussion of countermeasures like shuffling, masking, and DPA-resistant logic styles to decide how to protect smart cards.
A Side-Channel Analysis Resistant Description of the AES S-Box
This article introduces a new masking countermeasure which is not only secure against first-order side-channel attacks, but which also leads to relatively small implementations compared to other masking schemes implemented in dedicated hardware.
An ASIC Implementation of the AES SBoxes
This article presents a hardware implementation of the S-Boxes from the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), and shows that a calculation of this function and its inverse can be done efficiently with combinational logic.
An AES Smart Card Implementation Resistant to Power Analysis Attacks
An efficient AES software implementation that is well suited for 8-bit smart cards and resistant against power analysis attacks and randomization, and the results prove the theoretical assessment of the countermeasures to be correct.
Power-analysis attack on an ASIC AES implementation
- S. Yalcin, Frank K. Gürkaynak, E. Oswald, B. Preneel
- Computer Science, MathematicsInternational Conference on Information…
- 5 April 2004
This work presents the first results on the feasibility of power analysis attack against an AES hardware implementation and shows how to build a reliable measurement setup and how to improve the correlation coefficients, i.e., the signal to noise ratio for the authors' measurements.
Practical Template Attacks
This article provides answers to open issues, such as how to select points of interest in an efficient way, or how to preprocess noisy data, and points out that in practice so-called amplified template attacks have to be considered as a potential threat.
Successfully Attacking Masked AES Hardware Implementations
It turns out that masking the AES S-Boxes does not prevent DPA attacks, if glitches occur in the circuit.
Practical Second-Order DPA Attacks for Masked Smart Card Implementations of Block Ciphers
- E. Oswald, S. Mangard, Christoph Herbst, S. Tillich
- Mathematics, Computer ScienceCT-RSA
- 13 February 2006
An improved concept for second-order differential-power analysis (DPA) attacks on masked smart card implementations of block ciphers and gives evidence on the effectiveness of this methodology by showing practical attacks on a masked AES smart card implementation.
Leakage Resilient Cryptography in Practice
- François-Xavier Standaert, Olivier Pereira, Yu Yu, J. Quisquater, M. Yung, E. Oswald
- Mathematics, Computer ScienceTowards Hardware-Intrinsic Security
These works consider adversaries enhanced with abilities such as inserting faults during a computation or monitoring side-channel leakages.
Template Attacks on Masking - Resistance Is Futile
It turns out that a template-based DPA attack leads to the best results, and in the scenario of template attacks, masking does not improve the security of an implementation.