Share This Author
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- E. Maskin
- Economics
- 1999
If A is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR) assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals' preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set of…
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- D. Fudenberg, E. Maskin
- Economics
- 1 May 1986
TLDR
Monopoly with Incomplete Information
Recent theoretical research on principal-agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability…
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, E. Maskin
- Economics
- 1994
The authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played. They provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible, individually rational…
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
- P. Dasgupta, E. Maskin
- Economics
- 1986
The article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games. In this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of Nash equilibrium in games where…
Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies
- M. Dewatripont, E. Maskin
- Economics
- 1 October 1995
We study a credit model where, because of adverse selection, unprofitable projects may nevertheless be financed. Indeed they may continue to be financed even when shown to be low-quality if sunk…
Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
There is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high-bid auctions (auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid). See for example, Vickery (1961), Myerson (1981), riley…
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
THIS PAPER STUDIES AUCTIONS designed to maximize the expected revenue of a seller facing risk averse bidders with unknown preferences.2 Although we concentrate on auctions where a seller sells a…
Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation
- James Bessen, E. Maskin
- Business, Economics
- 1 January 2000
We argue that when innovation is “sequential” (so that each successive invention builds in an essential way on its predecessors) and “complementary” (so that each potential innovator takes a…
Asymmetric Auctions
- E. Maskin
- Economics
- 2007
The revenue-equivalence theorem' for auctions predicts that expected seller revenue is independent of the bidding rules, as long as equilibrium has the properties that the buyer with the highest…
...
...