• Publications
  • Influence
Redefine statistical significance
We propose to change the default P-value threshold for statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.005 for claims of new discoveries.
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Evolution of morality
© Oxford University Press, 2013. This chapter examines whether morality really evolved, as many philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, and biologists claim. It distinguishes three possibleExpand
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Doing without Concepts
List of Figures List of Tables Preface Acknowledgments Permissions CHAPTER 1 CONCEPTS IN PSYCHOLOGY 1. "Concept" in Psychology 2. Evidence for the Existence of Concepts 3. What is a PsychologicalExpand
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Semantics, cross-cultural style
Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy, and two views, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-historical view of reference, have dominated the field. In thisExpand
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Concept empiricism: A methodological critique
  • E. Machery
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • Cognition
  • 1 July 2007
Thanks to Barsalou's, Damasio's, Glenberg's, Prinz' and others' work, neo-empiricism is gaining a deserved recognition in the psychology and philosophy of concepts. I argue, however, thatExpand
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Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind*
  • E. Machery
  • Computer Science
  • Philosophy of Science
  • 1 July 2005
TLDR
A growing body of evidence suggests that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. Expand
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The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues
Recent experimental findings by Knobe and others (Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept ofExpand
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Against Arguments from Reference
It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on suchExpand
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Why I stopped worrying about the definition of life... and why you should as well
  • E. Machery
  • Philosophy, Computer Science
  • Synthese
  • 1 March 2012
TLDR
In several disciplines within science—evolutionary biology, molecular biology, astrobiology, synthetic biology, artificial life—and outside science—primarily ethics—efforts to define life have recently multiplied. Expand
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The amodal brain and the offloading hypothesis
  • E. Machery
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • Psychonomic bulletin & review
  • 9 June 2016
In this article, I argue that a growing body of evidence shows that concepts are amodal and I provide a novel interpretation of the body of evidence that was taken to support neo-empiricist theoriesExpand
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