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Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
- G. Chalkiadakis, E. Elkind, M. Wooldridge
- Economics, Computer ScienceComputational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
- 25 October 2011
This talk introduces basic concepts from cooperative game theory, and in particular the key solution concepts: the core and the Shapley value, and introduces the key issues that arise if one is to consider the cooperative games in a computational setting.
Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
- G. Chalkiadakis, E. Elkind, E. Markakis, M. Polukarov, N. Jennings
- Economics, Computer ScienceJ. Artif. Intell. Res.
- 1 September 2010
A model for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions-or overlapping coalition formation (OCF) games is introduced, and the issue of stability in this setting is explored, including a notion of the core, which generalizes the corresponding notion in the traditional (non-overlapping) scenario.
Proportional Justified Representation
Proportional Justified Representation is proposed, which is more demanding than JR, but, unlike EJR, it is compatible with perfect representation, and a committee that provides PJR can be computed in polynomial time if the committee size divides the number of voters.
Frugality in path auctions
This work investigates the payments the buyer must make in order to buy a path, and identifies the optimal mechanism with regard to total payment, which gives a lower bound on all mechanisms with Bayes--Nash equilibria.
Designing and learning optimal finite support auctions
- E. Elkind
- Computer ScienceSODA '07
- 7 January 2007
This paper demonstrates that a Myerson-style auction can be constructed in time polynomial in the number of bidders and the size of the support sets and shows that the optimal mechanism is an order-based auction and is used to prove the correctness of the learning algorithm as well as to bound its running time.
Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions
This paper considers the setting where all voters are strategic, and provides a complete analysis of the setting with two candidates, and shows that for three or more candidates the equilibria of sequential voting may behave in a counterintuitive manner.
Hedonic coalition nets
Hedonic coalition nets are shown to be universally expressive, yet are at least as succinct as other existing representation schemes for hedonic games, and the complexity of many natural decision problems for these games are investigated.
Group Activity Selection Problem
- Andreas Darmann, E. Elkind, Sascha Kurz, J. Lang, Joachim Schauer, G. Woeginger
- Economics, Computer ScienceWINE
- 10 December 2012
A general model is put forward for a setting where one has to organize one or several group activities for a set of agents, where agents' preferences are binary, i.e., each agent classifies all pairs of the form "(activity, group size)" into ones that are acceptable and ones that is not.
A hybrid exact algorithm for complete set partitioning
Properties of multiwinner voting rules
This paper considers committee selection rules that can be viewed as generalizations of single-winner scoring rules, including SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, STV, as well as several variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule and the Monroe rule and their approximations.