E. Elkind

Publications201
h-index37
Citations4,568
Highly Influential Citations381
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Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
TLDR
The theory of cooperative games provides a rich mathematical framework with which to understand the interactions between self-interested agents in settings where they can benefit from cooperation, and where binding agreements between agents can be made. Expand
  • 316
  • 18
  • PDF
Frugality in path auctions
TLDR
We consider the problem of picking (buying) an inexpensive s -- t path in a graph where edges are owned by independent (selfish) agents, and the cost of an edge is known to its owner only. Expand
  • 129
  • 16
  • PDF
Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
TLDR
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. Expand
  • 119
  • 16
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Designing and learning optimal finite support auctions
  • E. Elkind
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • SODA '07
  • 7 January 2007
TLDR
A classical paper of Myerson [18] shows how to construct an optimal (revenue-maximizing) auction in a model where bidders' values are drawn from known continuous distributions. Expand
  • 56
  • 13
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Proportional Justified Representation
TLDR
The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters' preferences. Expand
  • 58
  • 12
  • PDF
Properties of multiwinner voting rules
TLDR
We consider committee selection rules that can be viewed as generalizations of single-winner scoring rules, including SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, STV, as well as several variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule and the Monroe rule and their approximations. Expand
  • 169
  • 11
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Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions
TLDR
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. Expand
  • 82
  • 11
  • PDF
Swap Bribery
TLDR
In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes to get her preferred candidate elected. Expand
  • 113
  • 9
  • PDF
Hedonic coalition nets
TLDR
Hedonic coalition nets are a succinct, rule-based representation for hedonic games that can be used to represent coalitional games with transferable utility. Expand
  • 83
  • 9
  • PDF
On distance rationalizability of some voting rules
TLDR
We provide new results on distance rationalizability of several well-known voting rules such as all scoring rules, Approval, Young's rule and Maximin. Expand
  • 40
  • 9
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