The theory of cooperative games provides a rich mathematical framework with which to understand the interactions between self-interested agents in settings where they can benefit from cooperation, and where binding agreements between agents can be made.Expand

We consider the problem of picking (buying) an inexpensive s -- t path in a graph where edges are owned by independent (selfish) agents, and the cost of an edge is known to its owner only.Expand

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions.Expand

A classical paper of Myerson [18] shows how to construct an optimal (revenue-maximizing) auction in a model where bidders' values are drawn from known continuous distributions.Expand

We consider committee selection rules that can be viewed as generalizations of single-winner scoring rules, including SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, STV, as well as several variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule and the Monroe rule and their approximations.Expand

In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful.Expand

In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes to get her preferred candidate elected.Expand

Hedonic coalition nets are a succinct, rule-based representation for hedonic games that can be used to represent coalitional games with transferable utility.Expand

We provide new results on distance rationalizability of several well-known voting rules such as all scoring rules, Approval, Young's rule and Maximin.Expand