• Publications
  • Influence
Non-cooperative games
  • E. Damme
  • Psychology, Economics
  • 1 October 2000
We describe non-cooperative game models and discuss game theoretic solution concepts. Expand
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Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
A global game is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure is determined by a random draw from a given class of games and where each player makes a noisy observation of theExpand
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Stable equilibria and forward induction
  • E. Damme
  • Mathematics, Economics
  • 1 August 1989
This paper is an attempt to throw some light on the issues of whether requiring an equilibrium to be stable (in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens) is necessary for self-enforcingness and what theExpand
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Endogenous price leadership
We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which will follow. Expand
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Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
  • E. Damme
  • Mathematics, Economics
  • 1 February 1989
Abstract In this note it is shown that the requirement of weak renegatiation proofness does not eliminate any subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Specifically itExpand
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Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Practice
Drawing from the economics of two-sided markets, we provide suggestions for the definition of the relevant market in cases involving two-sided platforms, such as media outlets, online intermediaries,Expand
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Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing
Abstract This paper investigates which equilibria of a game are still viable when players have the opportunity to commit themselves. To that end we study a model of endogenous timing in which playersExpand
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Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research You may not further distribute the material or use it for anyExpand
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Infant access and handling in sooty mangabeys and vervet monkeys
Access to one’s newborn infant is a commodity that can be traded for other benefits such as grooming in nonhuman primates. According to the biological market paradigm, the price paid should fluctuateExpand
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When females trade grooming for grooming: testing partner control and partner choice models of cooperation in two primate species
We tested predictions following from the biological market paradigm using reciprocated grooming sessions among the adult females in a sooty mangabey, Cercocebus atys, group with 35 females (IvoryExpand
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