Douglas Lundin

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We present experimental evidence that promises and threats mitigate the hold–up problem. While investors rely as much on their own threats as on their trading partner’s promises, the latter are more credible. Building on recent work in psychology and behavioral economics, we then present a simple model within which agents are concerned about both fairness(More)
This study assessed the quality of health economic documentation submitted to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Board (PBB) in Sweden. Two different instruments were used in the evaluation: the PBB checklist, which was constructed by the authors from the PBB guidelines for health economic evaluations, and the QHES, a validated quality assessment instrument. Some(More)
Recent research claims that the major part of the observed reduction in suicide rates during the 1990s can be explained by the increase in the prescription of antidepressants. However, this conclusion is based on research that only looks at raw correlations; confounding effects from other variables are not controlled for. Using a rich Swedish data set, we(More)
OBJECTIVE To decompose drug spending in Sweden between the years 1990 and 2000. This paper updates a previous study, which looked at the period 1990-1995, by providing an additional 5 years of data (1995-2000) and extending the previous analysis in a number of ways. METHODS The paper builds on the earlier work that showed that changes in drug spending(More)
The objective of this review is to examine how drug spending in different age groups changed during the 1990s. Time series analysis of registered data on prescription drug spending were performed, along with two decompositions, one of which was spending in three components: price, quantity (defined daily dose) and residual. The size of the residual is a(More)
One of the main features of health insurance is moral hazard, as defined by Pauly [Pauly, M.V., 1968. The economics of moral hazard: comment. American Economic Review 58, 531-537), people face incentives for excess utilization of medical care since they do not pay the full marginal cost for provision. To mitigate the moral hazard problem, a coinsurance can(More)
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