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The paper studies a large class of bounded-rationality, probabilistic learning models on strategic-form games. The main assumption is that players ‘‘recognize’’ cyclic patterns in the observed history of play. The main result is convergence with probability one to a fixed pattern of pure strategy Nash equilibria, in a large class of ‘‘simple games’’ in… (More)

- Shlomit Hon-Snir, Dov Monderer, Aner Sela, Ezra Einy, Doron Sonsino, Benyamin Shitovitz
- 1998

We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then after sufficiently long time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot… (More)

- Doron Sonsino, Julia Sirota
- Games and Economic Behavior
- 2003

We explore the effects of social distance in experiments conducted over the Internet on three continents, in classroom laboratory sessions conducted in Israel and Spain, and in computer sessions pairing participants from different states, one in Texas and the other in California. Our design elicits individual behavior profiles over a range of contingencies,… (More)

- Galit Mador, Doron Sonsino, Uri Benzion
- 2000

We present experimental evidence suggesting that human subjects penalize lotteries for complexity. Our results contradict the assumption that human agents follow the discounted expected utility model in multi-period choice with uncertainty. In particular, we show that the buying price oered for an inferior, simple multi-period lottery may sometimes… (More)

(a) The observed bidding patterns depend on the type of asset under evaluation. In particular, subject behavior when buying or selling a basic lottery seems much more cautious than their behavior when buying or selling options on that lottery. (b) The observed bidding patterns also depend on subject positions with respect to the underlying asset. In… (More)

- Hovav Perets, Doron Sonsino
- IGTR
- 1999

- Ido Erev, Sharon Gilat-Yihyie, Davide Marchiori, Doron Sonsino
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 2015

- Doron Sonsino
- Int. J. Game Theory
- 1998

Assume that two risk neutral agents with asymmetric information simultaneously expect a gain from zero-sum betting. Geanakoplos and Sebenius (1983) (henceforth GS) consider the case where the agents may re-evaluate the profitability of betting successively before the payments are realized. They prove that one of the players must reject the proposed bet… (More)

An “unprocessed risk” is collection of simple lotteries with a reduction-rule that describes the actual-payoff to the decision-maker as a function of realized lottery outcomes. Experiments reveal that the willingness to pay for unprocessed risks is consistently biased towards the payoff-level in the unprocessed representation. The “anchoring-to-frame” bias… (More)