• Publications
  • Influence
Fair Division of a Graph
TLDR
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under an additional constraint: there is an undirected graph describing the relationship between the items, and each agent's share must form a connected subgraph of this graph. Expand
Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles
TLDR
We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an underlying item graph G. Expand
Graphical Hedonic Games of Bounded Treewidth
TLDR
Hedonic games are a well-studied model of coalition formation, in which selfish agents are partitioned into disjoint sets and agents care about the make-up of the coalition they end up in. Expand
Complexity of Hedonic Games with Dichotomous Preferences
TLDR
We study the computational complexity of questions related to finding optimal and stable partitions in dichotomous hedonic games under various ways of restricting and representing the collection of approved coalitions. Expand
Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections
TLDR
We show that no multiwinner voting rule can simultaneously satisfy a weak form of proportionality (a weakening of justified representation) and a strong form of strategyproofness. Expand
Simple Causes of Complexity in Hedonic Games
TLDR
In this paper, we identify simple conditions on expressivity of hedonic games that are sufficient for the problem of checking whether a given game admits a stable outcome to be computationally hard. Expand
Recognising Multidimensional Euclidean Preferences
TLDR
Euclidean preferences are a widely studied preference model, in which decision makers and alternatives are embedded in d-dimensional Euclidean space. Expand
Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism
TLDR
We study two influential voting rules proposed in the 1890s by Phragmen and Thiele, which elect a committee of k candidates which proportionally represents the voters. Expand
Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle
TLDR
We introduce the domain of preferences that are single- peaked on a circle, which is a generalization of the well-studied single-peaked domain. Expand
Single-Peakedness and Total Unimodularity: New Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Multi-Winner Elections
TLDR
We introduce a new technique: carefully chosen integer linear programming formulations for certain voting problems admit an LP relaxation which is totally unimodular if preferences are singlepeaked, and which thus admits an integral optimal solution. Expand
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