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In the context of the provision of one pure public good, we study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof rules satisfying the no vetoer condition. This question is qualified by the additional requirement that a domain shouldincludèà minimally rich domain.'' We first characterize generalized median voter schemes as(More)
Please cite this article in press as: S. Barberà et al., Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?, Abstract A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically(More)
We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially) strategy-proof, but (partially) group strategy-proof as well, in appropriate domains of de…nition. That is the case for the Gale-Shapley mechanism, the uniform rule and the top trading cycle solution, respectively. We embed these three types(More)
and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. Abstract: We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a …nite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. In turn, and as a consequence of the exit of some of its members, other(More)
* A previous version of this paper was entitled " Voting by Committees with Exit ". We are very grateful to the associate editor and two anonymous referees for their detailed suggestions and comments. We also thank Abstract: We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and(More)
We concentrate on the problem of the provision of one pure public good whenever agents that form the society have either single-plateaued preferences or single-peaked preferences over the set of alternatives. We are interested in comparing the relationships between di¤erent nonmanipulability notions under these two domains. On the single-peaked domain,(More)
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of definition. For the same reason, different conditions may be equivalent for functions defined on some domains, while not in other cases. Understanding the role of domains is therefore a crucial issue in mechanism design. We(More)
provided it is not made publicly available until 12 months after publication. Abstract We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of(More)
When the members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences , majority winners exist. Moreover, the median(s) of the preferred alternatives of voters is (are) indeed the majority (Condorcet) winner(s). This important result of Duncan Black (1958) has been crucial in the development of public economics and political economy, even if it only provides(More)