Divya Anantharaman

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Eventually the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 will require all publicly traded companies to implement clawback provisions. In the interim, some firms have chosen to implement the provisions voluntarily. Using the population of S&P 1500 firms over the period 2005-2009, we investigate the characteristics of firms that voluntarily adopt clawback provisions and those(More)
Agency theory posits that debt-like compensation (such as defined-benefit pensions and other deferred compensation) aligns managerial interests more closely with those of debtholders and reduces the agency cost of debt. Consistent with theory, we find that a higher CEO relative leverage, defined as the ratio of the CEO's inside leverage (debt-toequity(More)
This paper examines the association between conservatism and value relevance of accounting information. Prior literature (Lev & Zarowin 1999) has suggested that conservative accounting, especially the treatment of advertising and R&D, as one possible reason for decreasing value relevance. We measure conservatism using a variety of approaches in the extant(More)
First draft: 30th October, 2014 Current draft: 10th July 2015 Abstract Pension experts have long conjectured that pension accounting rules encourage firms to invest pension assets in risky asset classes (Zion and Carcache 2003, Gold 2005). The recent passage of IAS 19 Employee Benefits (Revised) (“IAS 19R”) marks a fundamental shift in pension accounting on(More)
Previous studies and regulators usually regard inside-debt compensation as a device to mitigate the conflict of interests between shareholders and debtholders, and believe that firms need to be enforced to pay their executives inside-debt compensations to resolve this conflict. However, in practice it is very common that firms voluntarily offer inside-debt(More)
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