In this paper the cone of convex cooperative fuzzy games is studied. As in the classical case of convex crisp games, these games have a large core and the fuzzy Shapley value is the barycen-ter of the core. Surprisingly, the core and the Weber set coincide * This paper was written while the authors were research fellows at the ZiF (Bielefeld) for the… (More)
In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. It turns out that the first domain restriction… (More)
We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players' preferences are additive.
The paper deals with division situations where individual claims can vary within closed intervals. Uncertainty of claims is removed * This paper was written while the authors were research fellows at the ZiF (Bielefeld) for the project " Procedural Approaches to Conflict Resolution " , 2002. We thank our hosts for their hospitality. 1 by compromising in a… (More)
For cooperative fuzzy games with a non−empty core hyper-cubes catching the core, the Weber set and the path solution cover are introduced. Using the bounding vectors of these hypercubes, compromise values are defined. Special attention is given to the relations between these values for convex fuzzy games. * This paper was written while the authors were… (More)
We study hedonic games with heterogeneous player types that re-‡ect her nationality, ethnic background, or skill type. Agents'prefer-ences are dictated by status-seeking where status can be either local or global. The two dimensions of status de…ne the two components of a generalized constant elasticity of substitution utility function. In this setting, we… (More)