In this paper the cone of convex cooperative fuzzy games is studied. As in the classical case of convex crisp games, these games have a large core and the fuzzy Shapley value is the barycen-ter of the core. Surprisingly, the core and the Weber set coincide * This paper was written while the authors were research fellows at the ZiF (Bielefeld) for the… (More)
In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. It turns out that the first domain restriction… (More)
We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players' preferences are additive.
Preface This book investigates the classical model of cooperative games with trans-ferable utility (TU-games) and models in which the players have the possibility to cooperate partially, namely fuzzy and multichoice games. In a crisp game the agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in cooperation with some other agents, while in a fuzzy game… (More)
In this paper interval bankruptcy games arising from bankruptcy situations with interval claims are introduced. For this class of cooperative games two (marginal−based) Shapley−like values are considered and the relation between them is studied. The work on this paper started while the authors were research fellows at ZiF (Bielefeld) for the project… (More)
The paper deals with division situations where individual claims can vary within closed intervals. Uncertainty of claims is removed * This paper was written while the authors were research fellows at the ZiF (Bielefeld) for the project " Procedural Approaches to Conflict Resolution " , 2002. We thank our hosts for their hospitality. 1 by compromising in a… (More)