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In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. It turns out that the first domain restriction… (More)
In this paper the cone of convex cooperative fuzzy games is studied. As in the classical case of convex crisp games, these games have a large core and the fuzzy Shapley value is the barycenter of the core. Surprisingly, the core and the Weber set coincide ∗This paper was written while the authors were research fellows at the ZiF (Bielefeld) for the project… (More)
The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Summary We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict… (More)
In this paper interval bankruptcy games arising from bankruptcy situations with interval claims are introduced. For this class of cooperative games two (marginal−based) Shapley−like values are considered and the relation between them is studied. The work on this paper started while the authors were research fellows at ZiF (Bielefeld) for the project… (More)
We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when playerspreferences are additive. JEL Classi cation : C71, C63.
We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist, and provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak… (More)
We introduce the serial contest by building on the desirable properties of two prominent contest games. This family of contest games relies both on relative efforts (as Tullock’s proposal) and on absolute effort differences (as difference-form contests). An additional desirable feature is that the serial contest is homogeneous of degree zero in contestants’… (More)
Preface This book investigates the classical model of cooperative games with trans-ferable utility (TU-games) and models in which the players have the possibility to cooperate partially, namely fuzzy and multichoice games. In a crisp game the agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in cooperation with some other agents, while in a fuzzy game… (More)
In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for de ning a social group. The rst procedure starts with the This is a substantial revision of our CentER Discussion Paper 2003-10, Tilburg University, with the same title. D. Dimitrov gratefully acknowledges nancial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG).