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We study stochastic games with incomplete information on one side, in which the transition is controlled by one of the players. We prove that if the informed player also controls the transitions, the game has a value, whereas if the uninformed player controls the transitions, the max-min value as well as the min-max value exist, but they may differ. We… (More)

We study a simple protocol for communication networks, in which users get no receipt acknowledgment of their requests. As a result, users hold partial and differential information over the state of the protocol. We characterize optimal behavior by viewing the protocol as a stochastic game with partial observation. We also study two classes of protocols that… (More)

We focus on two-player, two-armed bandit games. We analyze the joint effect on the informational spillovers between the players of the correlation between the risky arms, and the extent to which one's experimentation results are publicly disclosed. Our main results only depend on whethert informational shocks bring good or bad news. In the latter case,… (More)

Players who have a common interest are engaged in a game with incomplete information. Before playing they get differential signals that stochastically depend on the actual state of nature. These signal not only provide the players with partial information about the state of nature but also serve as a correlation means. Different information structures… (More)

We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games, by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an example of Aumann and Maschler (1995). We determine the value and identify the optimal strategies for a range of parameters.

We study finite zero-sum stochastic games in which players do not observe the actions of their opponent. Rather, in each stage, each player observes a stochastic signal that may depend on the current state and on the pair of actions chosen by the players. We assume that each player observes the state and his/her own action. We prove that the uniform max-min… (More)