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On the Competitive Ratio for Online Facility Location
TLDR
It is proved that the competitive ratio for Online Facility Location is Θ(log n/log log n), and it is shown that no randomized algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio better than Ω( log n/ log log n) against an oblivious adversary even if the demands lie on a line segment.
Enumerating subgraph instances using map-reduce
TLDR
This paper exploits the techniques of [1] for computing multiway joins (evaluating conjunctive queries) in a single map-reduce round for the simplest sample graph, the triangle, and addresses the matter of optimizing computation cost.
Selfish unsplittable flows
The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game
TLDR
This work provides a comprehensive collection of efficient algorithms, hardness results (both as NP-hardness and #P-completeness results), and structural results for these algorithmic problems related to the computation of Nash equilibria for the selfish routing game the authors consider.
Space Efficient Hash Tables with Worst Case Constant Access Time
TLDR
This is the first dictionary that has worst case constant access time and expected constant update time, works with (1 + ε)n space, and supports satellite information.
On the Power of Deterministic Mechanisms for Facility Location Games
TLDR
It is shown that for every K ≥ 3, there do not exist any deterministic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for K-Facility Location on the line, even for simple instances with K+1 agents.
Space Efficient Hash Tables with Worst Case Constant Access Time
TLDR
This is the first dictionary that has worst case constant access time and expected constant update time, works with (1+?) n space, and supports satellite information.
Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy
TLDR
It is shown that for arbitrary (non-negative and non-decreasing) latency functions, any best improvement sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium in at most as many steps as the number of players, and that for latency functions in class $\mathcal{D}$ , the pure Price of Anarchy is at most $\rho(\rho{D})$ , i.e. it is bounded by the price of Anarchy for non-atomic congestion games.
Stackelberg Strategies for Atomic Congestion Games
TLDR
It is shown that the PoA of LLF is at most 1/α for arbitrary latency functions, and at most $\alpha+(1-\alpha)\rho(\mathcal{D})$ for latency functions in class $\mathcal {D}$ , where α denotes the fraction of coordinated players.
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