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  • Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, Isaac, V Bhaskar, Timothy Besley, Marianne Bertrand +9 others
  • 2005
We present evidence on whether workers have social preferences by comparing workers' productivity under relative incentives, where individual effort imposes a negative externality on others, to their productivity under piece rates, where it does not. We find that the productivity of the average worker is at least 50 percent higher under piece rates than(More)
A 2_2 game is played repeatedly by two satisficing players. The game considered includes the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as games of coordination and common interest. Each player has an aspiration at each date, and takes an action. The action is switched at the subsequent period only if the achieved payoff falls below aspirations; the switching probability(More)
  • Timothy Besley, Madhav Aney, Oriana Bandiera, Oliver Denk, Avinash Dixit, Erica Field +6 others
  • 2009
This chapter develops a uni…ed analytical framework for studying the role of property rights in economic development. It addresses two fundamental and related questions concerning the relationship between property rights and economic activity. (i) What are the mechanisms through which property rights a¤ect economic activity? (ii) What are the determinants(More)
A large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the requirement that truthful reporting be a Bayesian equilibrium. This paper identifies mechanism design problems for which there is no loss in replacing Bayesian incentive compatibility by the stronger requirement of dominant strategies. We identify contexts where it is(More)
In models of aspiration-based reinforcement learning, agents adapt by comparing pay-offs achieved from actions chosen in the past with an aspiration level. Though such models are well-established in behavioural psychology, only recently have they begun to receive attention in game theory and its applications to economics and politics. This paper provides an(More)
In a one principal two-agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents, we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting. Delegation to an intermediary is also not in the principal's interest if the agents supply substitutes. It(More)
  • Kaushik Basu, George Akerlof, Abhijit Banerjee, Chris Barrett, Alaka Basu, Francois Bourgui-Gnon +11 others
  • 2006
The evidence that the same income can lead to different household decisions, depending on who the earner is, has led to an effort to replace the standard household model with the Ôcollective modelÕ, which recognises that a household's decisions depend on the power balance between the husband and the wife. This article recognises that the power balance can,(More)
We study effects on accountability in government service delivery of decentralizing administration of an antipoverty program. While governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to anti-poor policy biases owing to political capture, centralized delivery systems are additionally prone to bureaucratic corruption owing to problems in monitoring(More)