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- Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, +11 authors Debraj Ray
- 2005
We present evidence on whether workers have social preferences by comparing workers' productivity under relative incentives, where individual effort imposes a negative externality on others, to their productivity under piece rates, where it does not. We find that the productivity of the average worker is at least 50 percent higher under piece rates than… (More)
135 Despite the importance of this issue, not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture. Here we describe a model of two-party electoral competition with “probabilistic” voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on David Baron… (More)
A 2_2 game is played repeatedly by two satisficing players. The game considered includes the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as games of coordination and common interest. Each player has an aspiration at each date, and takes an action. The action is switched at the subsequent period only if the achieved payoff falls below aspirations; the switching probability… (More)
A large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the requirement that truthful reporting be a Bayesian equilibrium. This paper identifies mechanism design problems for which there is no loss in replacing Bayesian incentive compatibility by the stronger requirement of dominant strategies. We identify contexts where it is… (More)
- Michael Manove, Jorge Padilla, +4 authors Michael Riordan
- 1999
Commercial banks frequently encounter optimistic entrepreneurs whose perceptions are biased by wishful thinking. Bankers are left with a difficult screening problem: separating realistic entrepreneurs from optimists who may be clever, knowledgeable, and completely sincere. We build a game-theoretic model of the screening process. We show that although… (More)
- Kaushik Basu, Abhijit Banerjee, +12 authors Omar Robles
- 2006
The evidence that the same income can lead to different household decisions, depending on who the earner is, has led to an effort to replace the standard household model with the Ôcollective modelÕ, which recognises that a household's decisions depend on the power balance between the husband and the wife. This article recognises that the power balance can,… (More)
- Dilip Mookherjee, Masatoshi Tsumagari
- 2003
In a one principal two-agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents, we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting. Delegation to an intermediary is also not in the principal's interest if the agents supply substitutes. It… (More)
- Jonathan Bendor, Dilip Mookherjee, Debraj Ray
- IGTR
- 2001
In models of aspiration-based reinforcement learning, agents adapt by comparing pay-offs achieved from actions chosen in the past with an aspiration level. Though such models are well-established in behavioural psychology, only recently have they begun to receive attention in game theory and its applications to economics and politics. This paper provides an… (More)
The supposed failure of privatization in Latin America has recently become the source of street riots, protest demonstrations, and adverse news coverage. Riots in Arequipa, Peru, erupted in June 2002 following the announcement of a proposal to privatize power plants, while Cochabamba, Bolivia, witnessed a so-called water war in April 2000. Antiprivatization… (More)
- Dilip Mookherjee, Barry Sopher, Saumya Banerjee, Tom Palfrey, Gora Gangopadhyay
- 1994
Subjects played strategically similar 4 = 4 and 6 = 6 constant sum games under varying payoff scales. Substantial divergences from equilibrium predictions were exhibited. The dynamic pattern of play is best explained by a stimulus learning model whereby players allocate weight to different actions according to their Ž. relative time average payoff… (More)