• Publications
  • Influence
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm
We propose that dispersed outside ownership and the resulting managerial discretion come with costs but also with benefits. Even when tight control by shareholders is ex post efficient, itExpand
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Equilibrium and Welfare in Markets with Financially Constrained Arbitrageurs
We propose a multiperiod model in which competitive arbitrageurs exploit discrepancies between the prices of two identical risky assets traded in segmented markets. Arbitrageurs need to collateralizeExpand
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Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
Posttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free‐riding by the target shareholders lead the former to acquire as few sharcs as necessary to gain control. As moral hazard is most severe under suchExpand
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Limits of Arbitrage: The State of the Theory
We survey theoretical developments in the literature on the limits of arbitrage. This literature investigates how costs faced by arbitrageurs can prevent them from eliminating mispricings andExpand
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Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control
We analyze control transfers in firms with a dominant minority blockholder and otherwise dispersed owners, and show that the transaction mode is important. Negotiated block trades preserve a lowExpand
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Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
TLDR
We study the optimal design of incentive contracts for experts in different collusion environments and explore implications for the organization of delegated expertise. Expand
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Entrepreneurship in Equilibrium
This paper compares the financing of new ventures in start-ups (entrepreneurship) and in established firms (intrapreneurship). Intrapreneurship allows established firms to use information on failedExpand
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Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking
We study liquidity transfers between banks through the interbank borrowing and asset sale markets when (i) surplus banks providing liquidity have market power, (ii) there are frictions in the lendingExpand
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A Model of Financial Market Liquidity Based on Intermediary Capital
We present a model of financial market liquidity provided by financially constrained intermediaries. We show that market liquidity increases with the level of intermediary capital. We alsoExpand
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The Dynamics of Financially Constrained Arbitrage
We develop a model of financially constrained arbitrage, and use it to study the dynamics of arbitrage capital, liquidity, and asset prices. Arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies between assetsExpand
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