Learn More
This paper presents evidence on how farmers’ decisions to adopt a new crop, sunflower, relate to the adoption choices of farmers in their social network of family and friends. We show that the relationship is shaped as an inverse-U, suggesting social effects are positive when there are few adopters in the network, and negative when there are many. We also(More)
Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game. Our main results are(More)
This paper describes the correlations between inequality and the growth rates in crosscountry data. Using non-parametric methods, we show that the growth rate is an inverted U-shaped function of net changes in inequality: Changes in inequality (in any direction) are associated with reduced growth in the next period. The estimated relationship is robust to(More)
  • Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, +11 authors Debraj Ray
  • 2005
We present evidence on whether workers have social preferences by comparing workers’ productivity under relative incentives, where individual effort imposes a negative externality on others, to their productivity under piece rates, where it does not. We find that the productivity of the average worker is at least 50 percent higher under piece rates than(More)
We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process, with payoffs generated as coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. A process of coalition formation (PCF) is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be “justified” by the expectation of higher future value, compared to inaction. This future value, in turn, is endogenous: it(More)
A 2_2 game is played repeatedly by two satisficing players. The game considered includes the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as games of coordination and common interest. Each player has an aspiration at each date, and takes an action. The action is switched at the subsequent period only if the achieved payoff falls below aspirations; the switching probability(More)
This paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions. In many interesting economic games, coalition formation creates either negatï e externalities or positï e externalities for nonmembers. Examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs(More)
In this article we take an empirical cross-country perspective to investigate the robustness and causality of the link between income inequality and crime rates. First, we study the correlation between the Gini index and, respectively, homicide and robbery rates along different dimensions of the data (within and between countries). Second, we examine the(More)