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Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game. Our main results are(More)
This paper describes the correlations between inequality and the growth rates in crosscountry data. Using non-parametric methods, we show that the growth rate is an inverted U-shaped function of net changes in inequality: Changes in inequality (in any direction) are associated with reduced growth in the next period. The estimated relationship is robust to(More)
This paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions. In many interesting economic games, coalition formation creates either negati¨e externalities or posi-ti¨e externalities for nonmembers. Examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs(More)
A ccording to the Olson paradox, larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups in furthering their interests. We address the issue in a model with three distinctive features: explicit intergroup interaction, collective prizes with a varying mix of public and private characteristics, and nonlinear lobbying costs. The interplay of these features(More)
In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked thousands of applicants to re-rank schools in a new mechanism that is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. Our(More)
This paper presents evidence on how farmers' decisions to adopt a new crop, sunflower, relate to the adoption choices of farmers in their social network of family and friends. We show that the relationship is shaped as an inverse-U, suggesting social effects are positive when there are few adopters in the network, and negative when there are many. We also(More)
  • Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, +11 authors Debraj Ray
  • 2005
We present evidence on whether workers have social preferences by comparing workers' productivity under relative incentives, where individual effort imposes a negative externality on others, to their productivity under piece rates, where it does not. We find that the productivity of the average worker is at least 50 percent higher under piece rates than(More)
Lack of access to finance is often cited as a key reason for why poor people remain poor. This paper uses data on the Indian rural branch expansion program to provide empirical evidence on this issue. Between 1977 and 1990, the Indian central bank mandated that a commercial bank can open a branch in a location with one or more bank branches only if it opens(More)
A 2_2 game is played repeatedly by two satisficing players. The game considered includes the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as games of coordination and common interest. Each player has an aspiration at each date, and takes an action. The action is switched at the subsequent period only if the achieved payoff falls below aspirations; the switching probability(More)