David Soskice

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I set out and explain Piketty's model of the dynamics of capitalism based on two equations and the r > g inequality (his central contradiction of capitalism). I then take issue with Piketty's analysis of the rebuilding of inequality from the 1970s to the present on three grounds: First, his model is based on the (neo-classical) assumption that companies are(More)
Political economists have always been interested in the differences in economic and political institutions that occur across countries. Some regard these differences as deviations from 'best practice' that will dissolve as nations catch up to a technological or organizational leader. Others see them as the distillation of more durable historical choices for(More)
School-to-work patterns and issues are discussed for seven economies (France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US). The emphasis is placed on differences across countries in both the current labour market position of young people and recent trends therein, along with the institutions that regulate youth education, training and employment. The(More)
This paper presents a theory of social policy preferences that emphasizes the role of skills. The key to our argument is that individuals who have made risky investments in skills will demand insurance against the possible future loss of income from those investments. Most income is derived from past investments in skills, and because the transferability of(More)
Dani Rodrik January 2008 The focus of reforms in the developing world has moved from getting prices right to getting institutions right. This reflects the recognition that markets are unlikely to work well in the absence of a predictable and legitimate set of rules that support economic activity and dispense its fruits. “Governance reforms” have become the(More)
Monetary rules matter for the equilibrium rate of employment when the number of price-wage setters is small, even when assuming rational expectations, complete information, central bank precommitment, and absence of nominal rigidities. If the central bank is nonaccommodating, sufficiently large unions, bargaining independently, have an incentive to moderate(More)
The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan’s seminal work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically,(More)
Classical rational choice explanations of voting participation are widely thought to have failed. This article argues that the currently dominant Group Mobilization and Ethical Agency approaches have serious shortcomings in explaining individually rational turnout. It develops an informal social network (ISN) model in which people rationally vote if their(More)