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Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Games in which one party conveys private information to a second through messages typically admit large numbers of sequential equilibria, as the second party may entertain a wealth of beliefs in
Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory
We consider dynamic choice behavior under conditions of uncertainty, with emphasis on the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. Choice behavior in which an individual distinguishes between
Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations
I. Introduction, 323.—II. Formulation, 325.—III. An example, 326.—IV. Consistent price schemes, 328.—V. Back to the example, 332.—VI. Relaxing the assumptions, 333.—VII. Concluding remarks, 334.
Corporate culture and economic theory
INTRODUCTION In this chapter, I explore how an economic theorist might explain or model a concept such as corporate culture. While the theoretical construction that is given is far from inclusive
A REPRESENTATION THEOREM FOR "PREFERENCE FOR FLEXIBILITY"
This paper concerns individual choice among "opportunity sets," from which the individual will later choose a single object. In particular, it concerns preference relations on opportunity sets which
Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes
Bertrand's model of oligopoly, which gives perfectly competitive outcomes assumes that: (1) there is competition over prices and (2) production follows the realization of demand. We show that both of
Relational Incentive Contracts
Standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced. This paper studies the design of self-enforced
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