David M. Rahman

Learn More
Consider a group of individuals whose behavior is subject to moral hazard, and suppose that providing them with incentives requires a monitor to detect deviations. What about the monitor's deviations? I study mediated contracts and find that the monitor's deviations are effectively irrelevant. Hence, nobody needs to monitor the monitor. I also characterize(More)
Consider a strategic environment subject to moral hazard and adverse selection across multiple stages, with rich communication protocols. In this paper, we prove that for any allocation, there exist linear transfers to make it incentive compatible if and only if every undetectable deviation from honesty and obedience is unprofitable when the transfers equal(More)
An aggregate game is a normal-form game with the property that each player's payoff is a function only of his own strategy and an aggregate function of the strategy profile of all players. Aggregate games possess a set of purely algebraic properties that can often provide simple characterizations of equilibrium aggregates without first requiring that one(More)
A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule and (ii) whose solution with additional integer constraints(More)
In this paper I study the possibility of full surplus extraction on arbitrary type spaces, with three main results: (i) I characterize full surplus extraction, (ii) I characterize full surplus extraction assuming that the surplus-extracting allocation is implementable, and (iii) I show that virtually full surplus extraction implies full surplus extraction.(More)
This paper studies frequent monitoring in a simple in…nitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length. It shows that e¢ cient strongly symmetric perfect public equilibrium payo¤s can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when(More)
I study repeated games with mediated communication and frequent actions. I derive Folk Theorems with imperfect public and private monitoring under minimal detectability assumptions. Even in the limit, when noise is driven by Brownian motion and actions are arbitrarily frequent, as long as players are sufficiently patient they can attain virtually efficient(More)