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Partial Cross Ownership and Tacit Collusion
This paper shows how competing firms can facilitate tacit collusion by making passive investments in rivals. When firms are identical, only multilateral partial cross ownership (PCO) facilitatesExpand
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The Anticompetitive Effect of Passive Investment
There are many cases in which a firm passively invests in its competitor. The Article presents an economic analysis resolving several ambiguities in the economics literature and showing how evenExpand
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Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion
We examine the effects that passive investments in rival firms have on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit collusion. In general, these incentives depend in a complex way on the entire partialExpand
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Are Excessive Prices Really Self-Correcting?
Excessive pricing by a dominant firm is considered as one of the most blatant forms of abuse. Despite this, competition authorities frequently refrain from intervening against excessive prices. TheExpand
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Ec Competition Law and the Regulation of Passive Investments Among Competitors
Passive holdings and cross-investments among competing companies are common phenomena in the modern marketplace. Yet under certain market conditions such investments may cause anticompetitiveExpand
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A Coherent Approach to the Antitrust Prohibition of Excessive Pricing by Dominant Firms
The aim of this chapter is to provide a coherent approach to the prohibition of excessive pricing by dominant firms as an antitrust violation. It first highlights the rationale for the prohibitionExpand
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Excessive Pricing, Entry, Assessment, and Investment: Lessons from the Mittal Litigation
The role of antitrust in curtailing excessive prices has long been a contentious area. Consequently, the charging of excessive prices has been subjected to diverse levels of enforcement across theExpand
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The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects
Previous literature on boilerplate provisions focused on the asymmetric information between the supplier and consumers created by boilerplate language that includes harsh terms, which is aimed atExpand
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The Darker Side of the Moon: Assessment of Excessive Pricing and Proposal for a Post-Entry Price-Cut Benchmark
This paper explores the main grounds commonly used to justify non-intervention in antitrust cases of alleged excessive pricing. In doing so it questions the weight attributed to some of theseExpand
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Partial Ownership as a Strategic Variable to Facilitate Tacit Collusion
This paper investigates partial ownership as a strategic device to facilitate tacit collusion in a repeated game with and without cost asymmetries. Once partial ownership is acknowledged as aExpand
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