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Several issues relating to goodness of fit in structural equations are examined. The convergence and differentiation criteria, as applied by Bagozzi, are shown not to stand up under mathematical or...
Abstract We find that measures of board and ownership structure explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, after controlling for standard economic determinants of… (More)
Recent research argues that differences in the structure of top executive compensation plans and/or corporate culture explain cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance. However, this research does… (More)
This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this… (More)
The empirical research examining the association between typical measures of corporate governance and various accounting and economic outcomes has not produced a consistent set of results. We belie...
Stock and option compensation and the level of managerial equity incentives are aspects of corporate governance that are especially controversial to shareholders, institutional activists, and… (More)
Instrumental variable (IV) methods are commonly used in accounting research (e.g., earnings management, corporate governance, executive compensation, and disclosure research) when the regressor… (More)
This paper analyzes the valuation of a compensation contract from a manager's perspective. This perspective is appropriate, for example, in research on the incentive effects of a compensation plan,… (More)
Prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects.' However, one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of any… (More)
Abstract Using confidential data of executive-specific short-term bonus plans, we investigate the extent to which executives manipulate earnings to maximize the present value of bonus plan payments.… (More)