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Structural Equation Models with Unobservable Variables and Measurement Error: Algebra and Statistics:
TLDR
In this paper, the convergence and differentiation criteria, as applied by Bagozzi, are shown not to stand up under mathematical or... Expand
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Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance 1 The financial sup
Abstract We find that measures of board and ownership structure explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, after controlling for standard economic determinants ofExpand
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On the Use of Instrumental Variables in Accounting Research
Instrumental variable (IV) methods are commonly used in accounting research (e.g., earnings management, corporate governance, executive compensation, and disclosure research) when the regressorExpand
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The Incentives for Tax Planning
We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, theExpand
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Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities
This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity-based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined thisExpand
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The Power of the Pen and Executive Compensation
We examine the press' role in monitoring and influencing executive compensation practice using more than 11,000 press articles about CEO compensation from 1994 to 2002. Negative press coverage isExpand
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Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance
We examine the link between corporate governance, managerial incentives, and corporate tax avoidance. Similar to other investment opportunities that involve risky expected cash flows, unresolvedExpand
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PORTFOLIO CONSIDERATIONS IN VALUING EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION
This paper analyzes the valuation of a compensation contract from a manager's perspective. This perspective is appropriate, for example, in research on the incentive effects of a compensation plan,Expand
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Fees Paid to Audit Firms, Accrual Choices, and Corporate Governance
We examine the relation between the fees paid to auditors for audit and non‐audit services, and the choice of accrual measures for a large sample of firms. Using our pooled sample, we find that theExpand
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF ACCOUNTING AND MARKET MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE IN EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION CONTRACTS
Prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects.' However, one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of anyExpand
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