David Catteeuw

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We study how a group of adaptive agents can coordinate when competing for limited resources. A popular game theoretic model for this is the Minority Game. In this article we show that the coordination among learning agents can improve when agents use different learning parameters or even evolve their learning parameters. Better coordination leads to less(More)
Lewis signaling games are a standard model to study the emergence of language. We introduce win-stay/lose-inaction, a random process that only updates behavior on success and never deviates from what was once successful, prove that it always ends up in a state of optimal communication in all Lewis signaling games, and predict the number of interactions it(More)
Biologists have mostly studied under what circumstances honest signaling is stable. Stability, however, is not sufficient to explain the emergence of honest signaling. We study the evolution of honest signaling between selfish, adaptive individuals and observe that honest signaling can emerge through learning. More importantly, honest signaling may emerge(More)
We study honest signaling in the Philip Sidney game. Until now, researchers concentrated on verifying under what circumstances honest signaling is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Whereas the concept of ESS assumes infinite populations, we analyze here, for the first time, the more realistic scenario where populations are finite—which allows us to(More)
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