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  • Influence
Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK
We examine the effect of say on pay regulation in the UK. Consistent with the view that shareholders regard say on pay as a value-creating mechanism, the regulation's announcement triggered aExpand
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What Drives Sell-Side Analyst Compensation at High-Status Investment Banks?
We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with analysts’ annual compensation. We find compensation to be positively related to "All-Star" recognition,Expand
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Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from Option Backdating
We study whether outside directors are held accountable for poor monitoring of executive compensation by examining the reputation penalties to directors of firms involved in the option backdatingExpand
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The Use of Broker Votes to Reward Brokerage Firms' and Their Analysts' Research Activities
In traditional markets, the price mechanism directs the flow of resources and governs the process through which supply and demand are brought into equilibrium. In the investment-research industry,Expand
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An Empirical Examination of Sell-Side Brokerage Analysts' Published Research, Concierge Services, and High-Touch Services
This paper uses a proprietary panel dataset to categorize and quantify the activities that sell-side brokerage analysts use to build and sustain their network of buy-side client relations. We then ...
Professional Directors and Governance Quality
We examine professional directors—board members with no employment outside of serving as independent directors. We find that boards with a higher percentage of professional directors engage in moreExpand
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Shareholder Voting and Directors’ Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the U.K. (CRI 2009-004)
This paper investigates shareholder voting in the UK. The Directors’ Remuneration Report (DRR) Regulations of 2002 gave shareholders a mandatory non-binding vote on boardroom pay. First, using dataExpand