Daniele Vilone

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The evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods game addresses the emergence of cooperation within groups of individuals. However, the Public Goods game on large populations of interconnected individuals has been usually modeled without any knowledge about their group structure. In this paper, by focusing on collaboration networks, we show that it is possible(More)
In this Letter we present a new perspective for the study of the Public Goods games on complex networks. The idea of our approach is to consider a realistic structure for the groups in which Public goods games are played. Instead of assuming that the social network of contacts self-defines a group structure with identical topological properties, we(More)
The interplay of social and strategic motivations in human interactions is a largely unexplored topic in collective social phenomena. Whether individuals' decisions are taken in a purely strategic basis or due to social pressure without a rational background crucially influences the model outcome. Here we study a networked Prisoner's Dilemma in which(More)
Humans do not always make rational choices, a fact that experimental economics is putting on solid grounds. The social context plays an important role in determining our actions, and often we imitate friends or acquaintances without any strategic consideration. We explore here the interplay between strategic and social imitative behavior in a coordination(More)
Crowdsourcing is a process of accumulating the ideas, thoughts or information from many independent participants, with aim to find the best solution for a given challenge. Modern information technologies allow for massive number of subjects to be involved in a more or less spontaneous way. Still, the full potentials of crowdsourcing are yet to be reached.(More)
A discrete-time version of the replicator equation for two-strategy games is studied. The stationary properties differ from those of continuous time for sufficiently large values of the parameters, where periodic and chaotic behavior replace the usual fixed-point population solutions. We observe the familiar period-doubling and chaotic-band-splitting(More)
In this work we study a weak Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which both strategies and update rules are subjected to evolutionary pressure. Interactions among agents are specified by complex topologies, and we consider both homogeneous and heterogeneous situations. We consider deterministic and stochastic update rules for the strategies, which in turn may(More)
We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergence of cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG). We introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the one-dimensional euclidean lattice (a ring) and the complete graph by changing the value of one parameter (the probability p to add a link between(More)
In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers’ history of giving has a significant impact on the donor’s decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation can hardly emerge. In this work we use a Public Goods Game to investigate whether publicly available reputation scores(More)
A new model for the description of phenomena of social aggregation is presented. On the basis of psychological concepts (social norms, cultural coordinates, and so on), we conceive a cellular automaton in which different clusters of individuals can merge according to the cooperation among the agents. In their turn, the agents can cooperate or defect(More)