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Proofs of Retrievability (PoR), introduced by Juels and Kaliski [JK07], allow the client to store a file F on an untrusted server, and later run an efficient audit protocol in which the server proves that it (still) possesses the client's data. Constructions of PoR schemes attempt to minimize the client and server storage, the communication complexity of an… (More)

We study the design of cryptographic primitives resilient to key-leakage attacks, where an attacker can repeatedly and adaptively learn information about the secret key, subject only to the constraint that the overall amount of such information is bounded by some parameter ℓ. We construct a variety of leakage-resilient public-key systems including the first… (More)

Consider an abstract storage device Σ(G) that can hold a single element x from a xed, publicly known nite group G. Storage is private in the sense that an adversary does not have read access to Σ(G) at all. However, Σ(G) is non-robust in the sense that the adversary can modify its contents by adding some offset ∆ ∈ G. Due to the privacy of the storage… (More)

Oblivious RAM (ORAM) allows a client to access her data on a remote server while hiding the access pattern (which locations she is accessing) from the server. Beyond its immediate utility in allowing private computation over a client's outsourced data, ORAM also allows mutually distrustful parties to run secure-computations over their joint data with… (More)

We introduce the notion of " non-malleable codes " which relaxes the notion of error-correction and error-detection. Informally, a code is non-malleable if the message contained in a modified codeword is either the original message, or a completely unrelated value. In contrast to error-correction and error-detection, non-malleability can be achieved for… (More)

We construct the first public-key encryption scheme in the Bounded-Retrieval Model (BRM), providing security against various forms of adversarial " key leakage " attacks. In this model, the adversary is allowed to learn arbitrary information about the decryption key, subject only to the constraint that the overall amount of " leakage " is bounded by at most… (More)

We study the design of cryptographic primitives resistant to a large class of side-channel attacks, called " memory attacks " , where an attacker can repeatedly and adaptively learn information about the secret key, subject only to the constraint that the overall amount of such information is bounded by some parameter. Although the study of such primitives… (More)

Traditionally, symmetric-key message authentication codes (MACs) are easily built from pseudorandom functions (PRFs). In this work we propose a wide variety of other approaches to building efficient MACs, without going through a PRF first. In particular, unlike deter-ministic PRF-based MACs, where each message has a unique valid tag, we give a number of… (More)

Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables secure computation over the encrypted data of a single party. We explore how to extend this to multiple parties, using threshold fully homo-morphic encryption (TFHE). In such scheme, the parties jointly generate a common FHE public key along with a secret key that is shared among them; they can later cooperatively… (More)

The notion of differing-inputs obfuscation (diO) was introduced by Barak et al. (CRYPTO 2001). It guarantees that, for any two circuits C 0 , C 1 , if it is difficult to come up with an input x on which C 0 (x) = C 1 (x), then it should also be difficult to distinguish the obfuscation of C 0 from that of C 1. This is a strengthening of indistinguishability… (More)